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I. INTRODUCTION

War in modern times inevitably takes place in an increasingly
shrinking globe in which human activities and warfare exist in close
symbiotic relationship. The method and means of armed conflict have and
will continue to undergo striking changes in the Twenty-First Century.'
One of the most profound aspects of military combat is the impact that
armed conflict has on the natural environment itself, both direct and
collateral, not only in the war zone, but over the entire planet, above and
beyond the harms exerted on humans, buildings, and artifacts. It is hard to
imagine a war in which environmental damage in one degree or another
does not occur. Most weapons are capable of causing environmental harm
of some kind in the first instance, even though environmental harm may
not be intended.2

1. In this Article, the terms "war" and "armed conflict" are used interchangeably. Some
scholars distinguish between the two, using "war" for those situations in which a formal declaration
of war has been made. However, given the fact that in the post-World War II history of war the vast
majority of conflicts have occurred without formal declaration of war, the distinction serves little
purpose.

2. For instance, during World War I lead bullets imbedded in trees during the fierce battles
of that conflict poisoned forests. More recently, U.S. forces fired some 11,000 depleted uranium
rounds from tanks and aircraft during Operation Desert Storm. These munitions are particularly
valuable because of their ability to pierce armor. On the other hand, uranium is a radioactive heavy
metal that poses risks to both the environment and human beings. See Brigadier General Joseph G.
Garrett, III, The Army and the Environment: Environmental Considerations during Army

42, 42 (Richard
Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996). Once inside the body, either inhaled into the lungs or in a wound if
it strikes flesh, or ingested from contaminated water, depleted uranium can produce cancer in the
lungs, bones, blood, and kidneys. Helen Caldicott, The Spoils of War, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 6,
2002, at 5F. Pediatricians in the city of Basra in southern Iraq reported "an increase of six to twelve
times in the incidence of childhood leukemia and cancer" following the Gulf War. Id. Deaths from
cancer in Basra, the city closest to the Gulf War battlefields, increased from 34 in 1988, before the
war, to 219 five years later in 1996, to 586 deaths in 2000, a 17-fold increase. See TAKASHI
Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT

MORIZUMI, GLOBAL ASSOCIATION FOR BANNING DEPLETED URANIUM WEAPONS, A DIFFERENT
NUCLEAR WAR: THE CHILDREN OFTHE GULFWAR, availableat http://www.transnet-jp.com/DUban

(last visited June 17, 2003).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/2
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There are six main sources of environmental harm in times of war: (1)
Direct attacks upon the environment so as to achieve a military advantage
(such as earth-scorching, deforestation to prevent enemies from hiding,
blowing up caves in Afghanistan to weed out terrorists, and so on); (2)
Direct manipulations of the natural environment as a mode of warfare in
order to inflict damage on military targets - a topic known as
environmental modification techniques, which has received increased
attention in international law; (3) Attacks on installations such as dams,
dikes or power plants, which results in flooding and other environmental
havoc in the region; (4) Conventional attacks against enemy targets that,
in addition to destroying the military targets, produce foreseeable
collateral damage to the environment (such as deploying uranium shells
against enemy tanks, with the depleted uranium creating an environmental
hazard to civilians after the conflict terminates); (5) Unforeseeable
environmental harms that result from military battles, sometimes not
discovered until many years later (e.g., systematic oil discharge from U.S.
and Japanese warships sunk during World War U are claimed to have
produced consequential depletion of natural resources to the Solomon
Islands in recent times); and (6) Environmental damage from military
operations other than war (MOOTW) 3 (e.g., recently the Army Corps of
Engineers removed more than ten thousand tons of arsenic-contaminated
soil from the campus of American University and from nearby homes in
Washington, D.C. The grounds were used for testing chemical weapons in
World War I).' The Defense Department has requested broad exemptions
from environmental regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
so as to allow the military more discretion in exercises that may affect
marine mammals and endangered species.' The military's request pertains
to its perceived need to conduct sonar and underwater bombing exercises
that may violate the Act.6 Environmental activists have criticized the
military for conducting sonar exercises on the grounds that they cause the
bursting of eardrums of whales. 7 The Defense Department has had a longstanding objection of what it perceives to be excessive interference of
military exercises vis-4-vis restrictions that protect wildlife, air and water.8
For example, over three hundred endangered species are located on
3. See JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS, ch. V (Joint Publication
3-0, 1995) (for a basic description of MOOTW).
4. Removing a Legacy of World War I, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A16.
5. Jennifer Lee, Military Seeks Exemptions On Harming Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2003, at A27.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. id.
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military installations. 9 At the Marine base at Camp Pendleton, California,
soldiers must minimize the use of training with off-road vehicles and
curtail the digging of trenches because of endangered wildlife.'0 The
Pentagon is also seeking to override current regulations pertaining to the
disposal of hazardous materials and the restoration of contaminated sites. "
That is, the Pentagon wishes to exempt explosives and munitions from the
hazardous solid waste presently covered by environmental regulations.12
This Article examines the current norms and standards that exist in
international law that address environmental damage occurring in time of
war. To understand the complexity of the problem, I first address the
theoretical underpinning of environmental protection - comparing the
anthropocentric view and the competing view that the environment ought
to be protected because it has intrinsic value. These competing
perspectives. help frame the issue in the later examination of this Article
of relevant international conventions pertaining to the environment in time
of war. Next, this Article discusses the current laws of armed conflict, as
military planners must inevitably weigh the quantum of environmental
damages likely to be occasioned from given missions, and in doing so
refer to a traditional, yet evolving, set of norms embodied in customary
international law. I will then provide an overview of international
conventions that deal with various types of harms that are associated with
war, and which indirectly pertain to the environment. Then I will discuss
the two principal environment-specific conventions that have emerged in
modern times - Protocol I and the Environmental Modification
Convention of 1977 (ENMOD) - and analyze their strengths and
weaknesses, concluding that the relevant law is difficult to apply in
practice, is definitionally flawed, and lacks internal coherence. Moreover,
and equally discouraging, these provisions tend to regard the environment
as overriding human values so that, in certain scenarios, literally applied,
these conventions would sacrifice human lives, property, and infrastructure
so as to avoid environmental harms. I will then turn to an area of
international law that I believe is sorely lacking, a theoretical framework
for the process of war termination and restoration of the environment. I
will conclude by providing suggestions on how the law on the subject can
be enhanced to provide a more thorough protection of the environment in
time of war.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Lee, supra note 5, at A27.
Id.
Id.
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11. THE GROUNDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL

485

PROTECTION IN WARTIME

While the environmentally destructive character of war has been
present throughout history, only in the wake of the Vietnam War has the
international community expressed concern about the complex
interrelationship between warfare and the environment, resulting in a
growing tendency to focus attention on environmental harms as a separate
category of concern in the law of war.
The term "environment" is, in this Article, broadly construed to include
all features of the natural environment that make up the world's
ecosystem. The environment, then, consists of the conditions,
circumstances, substances and organisms that make up the environment.
By "conditions" I refer to physical phenomena such as weather patterns
and the composition of the atmosphere; by "circumstances" I mean the
boundaries of oceans and rivers, the presence of wetlands, lakes, rain
forests, and so on; by "substances" I mean such things as water, soil,
crops, oil, and so on; and by "organisms" I mean both animal and plant.
The notion of environment also, importantly to my thinking, extends to
human interests. Human beings take things from the environment and use
them, convert them, cultivate them, render them into artifacts, consume
them, and engage in aesthetic appreciation of the environment.
Environmental damage occurs if archaeological sites are bombed or
attacked during war. It seems self-evident that the attitude of military
planners in respecting an enemy's cultural and religious treasures is
important in terms of world opinion. Iraq, where civilization originated
about fifty-five hundred years ago, is one of the oldest known civilizations
in history. According to Holland Cotter,
Iraq has hundreds of thousands of archaeological sites. Some
10,000 have been identified... During the Persian Gulf War in 1991
at least one major archaeological monument, the colossal ziggurat
of Ur, was bombed. Shock from explosions damaged fragile
and the 13thstructures like the great brick vault at Ctesiphon,
3
Baghdad.'
in
Mustansiriya
the
called
university
Shock waves also caused cracks in the great audience hall at Ctesiphon, an
architectural wonder that has the largest single span of brickwork in the
world, dating 100 B.C. to A.D. 900, with a "graceful vault 120 feet high and
with an 83-foot span."' 4 In Baghdad itself there are a number of buildings
dating back to medieval times including "tombs, mosques, minarets, the
13. Holland Cotter, Oldest Human History is at Risk, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 2003, at El.
14. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

5

JOURNAL OFLaw,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW4 [2003], Art. 2
Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Vol. 15, Iss.

(Vol. 15

university and the revered Kadhumain, mosque and shrine. Baghdad also
has the country's largest archaeological museum, with a collection of the
finest Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian art in the world."' 5
When the environment is rendered unusable in a given region, due to
its destruction or depletion, human beings (and other species) are denied
its use until the environment is restored. There are two competing views
as to how to regard the environment and therefore what approach to take
in its protection - the "utilitarian" and "intrinsic value" doctrines.' 6 The
utilitarian approach, which I will refer to as the anthropocentric approach,
values the environment for what it provides us - air to breathe, soil with
which to cultivate crops and on which to graze livestock, rain and sunshine
to contribute to the growth of crops and the sustenance of our lives, trees
whose wood can be used for shelter, and so on. This utilitarian attitude
towards the protection of the environment sees the environment as
instrumental; that is, we enjoy and partake of it as a means to our own
further ends and purposes.
By contrast, the intrinsic value approach claims that the environment
simply has intrinsic value as an end in itself, above and beyond the utility
15. Id. Another repercussion of war that affects a nation's archaeological and artistic
treasures pertains to looting and plundering. After the Gulf War in 1991, ancient treasures of Iraq
were plundered from excavation sites, and museums were looted, with art and antiquities sold
illegally on international markets. John Noble Wilford, War in Iraq Would HaltAll DigsIn Region,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25,2003, at El. Some unexcavated sites were bulldozed and looters hauled away
stolen artifacts by the truckload. Id. There was widespread looting of artifacts in the wake of
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. See id.
Prior to the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, European research teams who had been
excavating along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers at sites such as Uruk, Assur, Nimrud, and
Ninevah, evacuated the country. Id. A number of archaeologists and the spokespeople of cultural
groups met with State and Defense Department officials to stress the importance of complying with
the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
Id. The treaty requires that combatants refrain from targeting cultural sites unless military targets
have been placed in close proximity to them. Id. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the
convention. Id. McGuire Gibson of the University of Chicago, who met with Pentagon officials,
said, "We reminded them that there are no natural hills in southern Iraq, and if you see a hill, in
most cases it's the mound of a buried ancient settlement." Id. As a result of this meeting, the State
Department added a panel on antiquities to the working groups studying Iraq's future, to help Iraq
protect its cultural heritage. Id. A spokesman for the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs said: "We fully subscribe to the view that this is an asset that belongs to the Iraqi
people.... We want some process put in place to make sure the antiqulities are not squandered and
sold off." Id. To avert the wide scale plundering and looting that occurred in 1991, "the
Archaeological Institute of America has called on the 'appropriate governments' to help protect
museums and sites and to help the Iraqi authorities rebuild museums and enforce laws against
plundering." Id.
16. Merrit P. Drucker, The Military Commander's Responsibilityfor the Environment, II
ENVTL ETHICS 135, 136-40 (1989).
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it has for human beings. When considering how to approach protection of
the environment, this view regards the environment's contribution to
human existence as only part of the picture. Intrinsic value theorists would
agree that environmental interests can be outweighed by human ones, but
intrinsic value advocates filtering environmental issues through a lens that
places greater emphasis on the environment qua environment than on
human interests. In analyzing the main question of this Article, namely, the
extent to which the present law of war facilitates the balancing of
environmental interests and human interests in time of war, the
anthropocentric/intrinsic theoretical divide will become more apparent.
In modem times, with the availability of weapons of mass destruction
and with the nature of war changing, there is little question but that there
often can be substantial environmental harm as a result of armed conflict,
and in recent years this has become a significant international political
issue. While the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945 destroyed the target areas, killed tens of thousands, and
provided an environmental catastrophe with the effects of radiation, the
international community voiced little concern over the environmental
impact, focusing purely on the anthropocentric harms. This may have been
due to the failure of the international community to understand, at that
time, the fragile nature of the environment, and the symbiotic relationship
between human activities and the environment. 7
During the Vietnam War U.S. forces sought to achieve tactical and
operational objectives by direct targeting and manipulation of the
environment. For instance, the United States famously used herbicides and
other chemical agents to destroy forests, vegetation, and croplands to cut
off the ability of the Communist forces to blend into the surrounding
vegetation and form small units to wear down the U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces. United States forces also cleared almost three-quarters
of a million acres of forest using "Rome Plows," heavy tractors with large
blades attached, in order to disrupt North Vietnamese and Viet Cong use
of the vegetation as cover.' In addition, the Air Force used chemical
agents in order to increase rainfall so as to soften the road surface and
cause them to collapse, to thereby reduce enemy mobility, and to divert
North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to attend to
the muddied roads.

17. See Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of
InternationalArmed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1997).
18. Michael N. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 265, 268 (2000); see also ARTHUR H. WESTING, ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1976).
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The impact of these military operations garnered domestic and
international attention, and coincided with the growth of the environmental
movement in the West. By the end of the Vietnam War, the concept of an
environment seemed to catalyze public opinion. The public perceived that
with Vietnam, the environment was visibly being placed at risk for an
unpopular cause. Nonetheless, at this point in history the word
"environment" appeared in no treaty on the law of war.
During the 1990-91 Gulf War the world's attention focused on warfare's
environmental impact when Saddarn Hussein "deliberately spilled between
seven and nine million barrels of oil [from Kuwaiti oil fields] into the
Persian Gulf and set 508 oil well heads ablaze, 82 of which were damaged
in a manner that caused oil to freely flow from them."' 9 This was the
largest spill, intentional or accidental, in history. The United Nations
addressed the matter in Resolution 687, in which the U.N. Security
Council held that Iraq was liable for "any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage, and the depletion of natural resources" inflicted
during the invasion of Kuwait.2° While the U.N. Security Council
delegates agreed that some international law was applicable, they were
unable to agree on which law was applicable. It was the U.S. position that
the actions of Iraq were militarily unnecessary and as such violative of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.2 ' The United States also claimed the actions
violated customary international law pertaining to proportionality and
necessity. 22 The resolution also established a fund to pay compensation for
claims arising out of this liability and established a commission to
administer the fund. The U.N. Security Council subsequently established
the U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC) to adjudicate claims against
Iraq to be paid out of a fund capitalized by a levy on Iraqi oil exports and
frozen Iraqi assets.23 Resolution 687 has created legal precedent in
connection with future wars, and may serve as a deterrent to encourage
19. Schmitt, supra note 18, at 269.
20. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg. 1 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
In all fairness, it should be noted that during Desert Storm, coalition forces attacked oil tankers that
may have contributed to thirty percent of the total amount of oil spilled during that conflict.
Schmitt, supra note 18, at 18 n.71. Nonetheless, many think that the United States conducted the
most environmentally conscious military campaign in its history during Desert Storm, and that the
U.S. military forces have gotten even more environmentally conscious since then. Id. at 22.
21, Schmitt, supra note 18, at 27.
22, See id.
23. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991); see also Hazel M. Fox, Reparationsand State Responsibility,
in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGUtSH LAW 261 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993);

John R. Crook, The United Nations CompensationCommission-A New Structure to Enforce State
Responsibility, 87 AM. J.INT'LL. 144 (1993).
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states to take environmental factors seriously into account before engaging
in certain actions during war.
Ili. ENVIRONMENTAL HARM IN WAR AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS

While it is clear that responsible environmental stewardship is crucial
to the security of individual states in times of peace,24 war itself imposes
environmental degradation that can and often does become a threat to the
internal security of states. Furthermore, even in the absence of war,
environmental damage by itself, in the form of resource degradation or
resource scarcity, can and often does result in forced migration that in turn
creates or exacerbates conflicts both within and between states. Traditional
notions of national security have focused on military and economic
measures, waging war, and winning, while ignoring environmental harms
as causes of destabilization. NATO and its member states have recently
started directing significant resources to study the relationship between
environmental degradation and conflict.2 The evidence is striking in
showing a linkage between environmental harms and threats to a nation's
internal security. Take, for example, the following cases:
" In the past 50 years, 10 million Bangladeshis have fled their homeland
and immigrated illegally into India, greatly exacerbating ethnic
tensions there, and occasionally leading to open conflict. The refugees
have fled from traditional lands that, now degraded, can no longer
support them.26
" On the isolated Easter Island in the Pacific Ocean, site of the enormous
statutes made famous by Thor Heyerdahl's research, inhabitants cut
down the island's last remaining forests in the Seventeenth Century.
This soon led to water scarcity and food shortages, since trees no
longer held groundwater and no more canoes could be built for fishing.

24. The typical areas of environmental concern in time of peace that impact on national
security are such harms as acid rain, transboundary pollution from volatile organic compounds,
radioactive contamination, and other harms. While these environmental problems may seem
irrelevant to national security, the direct impact on citizens from skin cancers and respiratory
ailments can be no less harmful than battlefield injuries. In this regard, efforts to reach meaningful
international environmental agreements are of similar importance to the law of war as it pertains
to the environment. Both reduce the risk of harm to a state's citizens.
25. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1363

(1998).
26. Nick Robins & Charlie Pye-Smith, The Ecology of Violence, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 8,
1997, at 12, cited in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 25, at 1364.
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In a matter of years, the society disintegrated into civil war and
cannibalism.27
Scientists predict that a likely result of global warming will be a rise in
sea level. Low-lying countries, quite literally, may sink beneath the
ocean waters.
* In the early 1990s, Slovakia designed and began construction of a
nuclear power plant using Soviet technology and design. The
Mochovce Power Station was sited near the Austrian border. Austria
complained formally to Slovakia over the location of an unreliable and
potentially dangerous facility so close to its borders.28
* The wars in Afghanistan (both the Afghani-Soviet War and Operation
Enduring Freedom following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001) have resulted in widespread deforestation in several regions and
has taken a toll on wildlife.29 The problem has been exacerbated by
droughts in some areas of Afghanistan and the increasingly powerful
warlords who exploit unauthorized logging, the displacement of
populations, and the weakness of the central and local governments.3"
The situation is an illustration of how war causes widespread
destruction of the environment, and the environmental depletion in turn
causes migration that in turn causes further conflict.
The most obvious threat to national security predicated on wartime
environmental damage involves mass migration. People forced to leave
their traditional land because it can no longer support them have been
described as environmental refugees, and their numbers are increasing on
an unprecedented scale, as was recently witnessed with Operation
Enduring Freedom. There are now millions of environmental refugees,
perhaps outnumbering the roughly twenty-three million refugees displaced
by civil wars, political oppression, and ethnic, and religious persecution. 3
In the Gaza Strip, a constant site of friction between Israelis and
Palestinians, scarce water and its allocation are a significant source of
dispute. 2
Researchers at the University of Toronto have studied over ten cases
of conflict in developing countries. They conclude that three principle
27. CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE

(1992), cited in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 25, at 1364.
28. See Austrian Chancellor Warns Mochovce, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, May 18, 1998, at 3.
29. See Carlotta Gall, War-ScarredAfghanistan In Environmental Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30. 2003, at A 13.
30. Id.
31. See HUNTER ET AL, supra note 25, at 1364.
32. See id.
COLLAPSE OF GREAT CIVILIZATIONS
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factors increase conflict over environmental resources: degradation and
depletion of a key resource, population growth that increases resource
demands, and disproportionate allocation of a key resource within society.
Their research, they contend, establishes a causal link between
environmental scarcity, poverty, and migration; and all three factors
interact to undermine state stability. 3
IV. CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF WAR AND THE

ENVIRONMENT: MILITARY NECESSITY,
PROPORTIONALITY, AND HUMANITY

This discussion focuses not on an analysis of thejus ad bellum issue of
when it is rightful to declare war, but rather on the issue ofjus in belli, that
is, how, rather than when, force may be employed in combat. International
law scholars generally agree that there are three traditional principles of
customary international law that govern the conduct of belligerents necessity, proportionality, and humanity.34 These principles protect the
natural environment only indirectly and inadequately, but are worth noting
because these principles often enough are in conflict with, or are
overridden by, the two main environmental treaties discussed in this
Article.
As often is the case in combat decision making, the law of war requires
a balancing of competing interests. Is the military advantage to be gained
from a proposed target worth the direct and consequential damage to the
ecosystem that likely will result? At times, this means balancing the means
and methods of military deployments in terms of the extent to which
human interests (in their lives, property and infrastructure) may trump
environmental interests, from an anthropocentric point of view or, to what
extent the former may need to give way to the latter, from an intrinsic
value perspective.
A. Military Necessity
The general rule of military necessity is that "a combatant is justified
in applying any force necessary to secure the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible - as long as the means are not prohibited by
the provisions of the law of war. 3 5 Military necessity contemplates
restrictions on the degree of force used; only "measures of regulated force
33. See id. at 1365.
34. Capt. William A.Wilcox, Jr., EnvironmentalProtectionin Combat,17 S.ILL. U.L.J. 299,
302 (1993).
35. Id.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
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not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the
prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditures of
economic and human resources" may be applied.36 The selection of targets
is strictly limited by military necessity. 37 Any destruction inflicted must be
required to secure the submission of the enemy with the minimum
expenditure of resources. Of course, this is no more than what prudence
would dictate in the conduct of war. Under the necessity principle, attacks
on noncombatants and their property are almost always forbidden, whether
deliberate or inadvertent. Injury to noncombatants is permitted only when
enemy forces or other military targets are located nearby, and then only
when the injury is proportionate to the military advantage gained by the
attack.38
The principle of military necessity was in part codified by the Hague
IV Convention, which in Article 23(g) prohibits acts that "destroy or seize
the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war."39 The international community
generally interprets this to pertain to any and all property, whether
property belonging to an enemy government or civilians.4 ° Clearly, the
provision applies not only to real property but also to items such as
livestock, crops, and the like.4 The United States interprets this provision
as protecting civilian property unless it "effectively contribute[s] to the
enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability. 4 2 Thus, civilian
foodstuffs, agriculture areas, livestock, and drinking water supplies are
protected from attack, unless they directly support enemy military
36. Andrew D. McClintock, Comment, The Law of War: CoalitionAttacks on IraqiChemical
and Biological Weapon Storage and Production Facilities, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 633, 641

(1993).
37. GuRUSWAMY ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1052

(1999).
38. Id.
39. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(g),
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV Convention].
40. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 63.
41. Id. at 64. The Nuremberg War Crimes Commission cited article 23(g) in charges against
ten German administrators for the unnecessary destruction of Polish timber forests. See Anthony
Leibler, Deliberate Wartime EnvironmentalDamage: New Challengesfor internationalLaw, 23
CAL. W. INT'L L.l 67,106 (1992) (citing Case 7150-496 U.N. War Crimes Commission (1948)).
42. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (Rev. A), FMFM 1-10 (1989), Supp. 1989, at 8-2 n.9 [hereinafter
NWP 9]. This definition is intended to protect civilian property as defined by the Geneva
Conventions. See id. at 8-2 n.9; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug.
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
arts. 52(2), 57(2)(b), U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 1(1977), reprintedin 16 LL.M. 1391, 1414, 1416
(1977) [hereinafter Protocol 1].
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operations.43 This principle is accepted by the United States as reflecting
customary international law." According to the Army's field manual, the
poisoning of water wells and streams, as well as pillage and purposeless
destruction, are punishable as war crimes. 4' Facilities dedicated to art,
religion, science, or charity, must also be spared, along with hospitals and
historic monuments, since their destruction would serve no military
purpose.46
I would think that the Hague IV Convention is broad enough in scope
as to pertain to evolving notions of property, the kinds of property that
were not specifically at issue at the time, but which are of uppermost
concern to the international community today, such as oceans, seabeds (the
high seas being regarded as res communes - that is, the commons), the
atmosphere, migratory birds, the lithosphere, and so on. The classic case
involving military targets of property involved General Lothar Rendulic,
a German commander in the Second World War who utilized a doctrine
of scorched earth to stall Russian troops advancing into Norway. 47 After
evacuating the residents of the province of Finmark, Rendulic destroyed
villages and other facilities to deny them to the Russians. 48 After the war,
Rendulic was charged with destruction of property, but he was acquitted
on the basis that his actions were justified by military necessity given his
assessment of the situation at the time.49
In my view the principles of the Hague IV Convention are very useful
in protecting the environment during warfare. One commentator suggested
that had the Hague IV Convention principles "been observed by Iraq, there

43. See GURUSWAMY

ET AL, supra note 37, at 1052.
44. See, e.g., NWP 9, supra note 42, Supp. 1989, 8-4 n.15.
45. See GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1052.
46. See, e.g., Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic
Monuments (Roerich Pact), Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240

(signed but not ratified by the United States).
47. Ensign Florencio J.Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" the International Laws of Armed Conflict to
Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, I1 AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 793, 815 (1996).
48. Id.
49. See United States v. List, XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals 757, 1295-97 (1946-49).
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would have been no significant violation of the Kuwaiti environment." 50
Military necessity is no defense for acts that violate other principles
embodied under the law of war. That is, according to the Nuremberg war
crimes tribunal, the "rules of international law
must be followed even if it
'5
war."'
a
even
or
battle
a
of
loss
the
in
results
B. ProportionalityPrinciple
The proportionality principle "prohibits methods of warfare likely to
cause injury to civilians in excess of any concrete direct military
advantage."5 2 The proportionality test relates to the military actions, as
well as anticipated military actions, of both sides of a conflict. The
proportionality principle makes for difficult calculations because it is
based on a value-based balancing test, and it is always difficult to agree on
proportionality when the lives of human civilians are at stake.
Furthermore, often enough the values involved have a cultural and
contextual backdrop. The value that societies place on life and suffering
differ dramatically across cultures and faiths. Japanese kamikaze pilots
during World War 11, for example, deliberately went to their deaths in
horrifying suicidal exploits. The pilots, who were of the Shinto faith,
believed that their lives had no value except as instruments in service of
the Japanese emperor in the pursuit of his wartime efforts. Suicide
bombers of terrorist groups, as well, often believe that they will go to
heaven by acting in a foolhardy and excessive way.
Some combatants may feel that the value of the environment pales in
significance to their emotional and passionate interest in the ideals they are
defending in the conflict. Often enough, combatants of developing
countries have a lower regard for environmental protection than
combatants of developed countries, and this can be a factor in how they
apply the proportionality principle. 3 The value feature of the
proportionality test also depends on the historical context. Today we see
a good deal more environmental consciousness throughout the world than
50. James P. Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm, 45
NAVAL WARC. REV. 61,63 (1992). Iraq was not a party to the Hague IV Convention when it was
enacted in 1907, at a time when it was part of the Ottoman Empire. Later, when Iraq became a
British mandate, Great Britain never acceded to the Hague IV Convention on behalf of Iraq, and
even after lraq gained independence in 1932 it did not become apartyto the Hague IV Convention.
Nonetheless, the fact that the treaty is recognized as part of customary international law makes it
the case that it applies to all nations whether or not they are a party to the Hague IV Convention.
51. List, XI Trials of War Criminals at 1272.
52. Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal
for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J.INT'L L. 165, 168 (1992).
53. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 57.
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a half-century ago. Today, if military planners considered the
proportionality test in assessing the value of the military advantage gained
in the Chinese in the Second Sino-Japanese War incident of dynamiting
the Huayuankow dike of the Yellow River (discussed below), resulting in
the drowning of several hundred thousand and an incredibly vast waste of
crops and lands, the balancing of collateral damage against military
advantage might well result in the consensus that the action would be
deemed disproportional.
Inherent in the proportionality principle is the notion of discrimination.
Discrimination requires "that weapons and tactics clearly must
discriminate between military objectives and civilian targets. 54 That is,
the means of warfare should not be indiscriminate. As we shall see, the
two principal conventions discussed in this Article, Protocol I and
ENMOD, seem to codify the discrimination notion.
Another element of the proportionality test is how likely it is that a
certain quantum of damage will occur. Usually military planners can be
somewhat precise about the effect of collateral damage to the
infrastructure of a population, such as the extent of reverberating effects
from taking down a command and control network will have on hospitals
losing electricity in the region. With more precise weapons, such as the
smart weapons that were deployed in Desert Storm and more recently in
Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the expectation of what
constitutes acceptable, i.e., proportional, collateral damage to the
environment may well be more narrow than even a decade ago. But
despite advances in military technology, forecasting environmental
damage is much less susceptible to accurate assessment than is predicting
damage to the human infrastructure. This is due in large part to the
complex interconnectedness and multiple components that make up the
environment.
C. Humanity Principle
The humanity principle pertains to the impact of war actions on the
environment insofar as it prohibits methods and means of warfare that are
inhumane." The humanity principle can be violated with respect to the
54. Mark Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare:
Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 479, 495 (1993).
55. The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 was the first formal expression of the humanity
principle. The Declaration provided:
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating
as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which
states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force
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environment in many ways, such as poisoning water supplies, dispersing
chemical or biological agencies to infect a human population or
contaminate its crops or livestock, or destroying a population's food
source directly, or by blockade (such as occurred, in fact, with the German
blockade of St. Petersburg during World War H). The humanity principle
forbids the wanton attack of civilians, as well as acts or threats if the
primary purpose is to terrorize civilians. 6 As such, it provides for a
constraint on the care in the selection of methods, weaponry, and targets,
the hallmarks of the discrimination principle." That is, the means of
warfare should not be indiscriminate.
Generally, the humanity principle pertains to deontological constraints.
It is impermissible under any circumstances, for example, to starve a
human population or poison a population's water, and so on, no matter
how beneficial a military advantage might be gained by the action.
Traditionally, the humanity principle pertained to human suffering, so that
while certain acts committed by combatants against other human beings,
such as torture and rape, are impermissible under any circumstances, the
humanity principle did not usually lend itself to an evaluation of
environmental damage as such - but only indirectly, as in the case of
poisoning the water supply of a population. The harm, from a humanity
principle viewpoint, is anthropocentric. While the water itself is ruined,
and the water is part of the natural environment, the humanity principle
seems to have been concerned with the human impact of environmental
attacks. This may have shifted in the international community in light of
the Iraqi actions during the Gulf War. The international community
viewed the acts as per se reprehensible, and universally condemned Iraq
for what took place. This seems to suggest a shift in the scope of the
humanity principle.

of the enemy; That for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men; That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death
inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the
laws of humanity.

Declaration of St. Petersburg Renouncing the Use of in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes in Weight, Nov. 29, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp.) [hereinafter St.
Petersburg Declaration].
56. McClintock, supra note 36, at 646.
57. See Caggiano, supra note 54, at 495.
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V. OVERVIEW

A number of international instruments have enjoyed varying degrees
of acceptance in providing rule of the law of armed conflict which
expressly concern the environment:
1. The most far-reaching environmental-war document to date is
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I),"
which prohibits the use of methods and means of warfare which are
intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the natural environment. Protocol I prohibits, with certain
exceptions, attacks against the environment that would prejudice the health
or survival of the population. It also prohibits (except in certain narrowly
defined circumstances) attacks upon works and installations that might
unleash hazardous forces against civilians, such as dams and nuclear
power plants. Protocol I also prohibits attacks on "objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population," such as foodstuffs and drinking
water.59 The United States, the United Kingdom, and France have rejected
Protocol I mainly because it appears to erode the traditional international
legal doctrine of military necessity.
2. The treaty that is most broadly applicable to environmental warfare
is ENMOD, which prohibits the "hostile use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe
effects" as a means of inflicting damage.9 The United States has ratified
ENMOD.
3. Customary international law, which pertains to situations not
specifically embodied by treaties, fills in gaps or ambiguities, and
remedies any deficiencies in treaties,6 is generally interpreted to prohibit
the unnecessary and wanton destruction of the environment, and requires
62
that belligerents show due regard for the protection of the environment.
In addition, the following international conventions, while not
specifically directed towards environmental protection, nonetheless have
general application to the environment:

58. See Protocol I, supra note 42.
59. Id. art. 54.
60. See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, arts. 1.1., 11,31 U.S.T. 333,1108 U.N.T.S.
152 [hereinafter ENMOD].
61. Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the
Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON. L. REV. 1047, 1074 (1999).
62. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. Navy Doc. NWP 1-14M, 1995,1 8.1.3 [hereinafter NWP 1-14M].
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4. The Hague Convention, which prohibits the wanton destruction of
property, that is, such destruction that is not demanded by the necessities
of war.63
5. The 1925 Gas Protocol,' 4 which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating,
poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, and
devices. ' , 65 When the United States ratified the 1925 Gas Protocol in 1972,
it included a first-use reservation stating that it would not be bound by the
prohibitions if the other side of a conflict violated the agreement first.66
In 1969, following reports of the United States using chemical agencies
such as herbicides in the Vietnam War, the U.N. General Assembly passed
a resolution declaring that the 1925 Gas Protocol prohibits the use in armed
conflicts of:
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare - chemical substances,
whether gaseous, liquid or solid - which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants;
(b) Any biological agents of warfare - living organisms, whatever
their nature, or infective material derived from them - which are
intended to cause disease and death in man, animals or plants, and
which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the
person, animal or plant attacked.67
The question of whether the 1925 Gas Protocol covers this broad scope of
chemical substances remains controversial. For example, one commentator
noted that "this Protocol was never intended to protect the environment,
and... even the employment of herbicides and defoliant agents of the
types used during the Vietnam War would only be prohibited to the extent

63. See Hague IV Convention, supra note 39, art. 23(g).
64. Protocol for the Prohibition on the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
65. Id. pmbl.
66.
The Protocol shall cease to be binding on the government of the United States
with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy state if such state
or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Reservation Made on Ratification, reprinted in

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS

126 (Dietrich

Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988).
67. G.A. Res. 2603 A, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7890 (1969).
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that they can be proven to be toxic to human beings and to actually cause
human
casualties. 68
6. The
Chemical Weapons Convention 9 and the Biological Weapons
Convention 7° are prohibitions on the use of chemical and biological
agencies or weapons, both of which are capable of devastating the
environment, and the prohibition of even the possession of biological or
toxin agents. The Chemical Weapons Convention binds the parties not to
use, under any circumstances, chemical weapons, or to "develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer,
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone."' The Chemical
Weapons Convention is complementary to the 1925 Gas Protocol, and
addresses several controversial issues arising from the latter, including the
debate over whether herbicides can be termed chemicals.7
7. The U.N. Conventional Weapons Convention, 7 which places restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons.
8. Other international agreements are meant to protect specific
geographical areas from the effects of particular weapons or from armed
conflict generally. Nuclear weapons are prohibited altogether on the floor
of the sea,74 in outer space,75 and in Latin America.76
Because Protocol I and ENMOD specifically address the topic of this
Article, namely, environmental damage in the context of warfare, I will
focus my discussion on those documents.
68. Wil D. Verwey, Protectionof the Environmentin Times ofArmed Conflict: Do We Need
Additional Rules?, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT, supra note

2, at 559, 563.
69. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) [hereinafter
Chemical Weapons Convention].
70. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
71. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 69, art. 191)(a).
72. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 88.
73. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, with annexed
Protocols, Oct. 10, 1980, Protocol II & III, 1342, U.N.T.S. 137.
74. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971,
23 U.S.T. 701,955 U.N.T.S. 115.
75. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610

U.N.T.S. 205.
76. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 362.
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A. ProtocolI
The laying to waste of the environment in armed conflicts has been of
concern since ancient times. Thucydides, for example, recounts the laying
to waste of Athenian fields by the Spartans during the annual sieges of
Attica in the Peloponnesian Wars.77 During the Boer War, the British
commander, Horatio Kitchener, engaged in a ruthless scorched earth
campaign in which farms were burned to deny Boer forces the sustenance
on which they relied.78 In the next century, the rich Romanian oil fields
were attacked by British Colonel Norton Griffiths in order to prevent them
from falling into the hands of the invading Central Powers of the First
World War. 79 Romanian oil was again targeted during the Second World
War, particularly through the famous 1943 air raid against Ploesti. ° Of
course, the two incidents which caused the greatest environmental
calamity in the history of armed conflict were the atomic bomb attacks on
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.
Efforts to set standards limiting destruction of the environment during
armed conflict can be seen as far back as in Biblical injunctions. For
example, the Old Testament provides this instruction: "If you besiege a
town for a long time, making war against it in order to take it, you must
not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them.... You may destroy
only the trees that you know do not produce food."'" Hugo Grotius said
that "if trees could speak, they would cry out that since they are not the
cause of war it is wrong for them to bear its penalties." 2
Protocol I is the first modern convention specifically protecting the
environment in time of war.8 3 It pertains to these two broad areas: (1)
general protection of the natural environment;8 4 and (2) protection of those

77. See, e.g., THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, §§ 2.19, 2.23, 2.47, 2.55, 2.57, 3.1,
3.26, 4.2 (Robert Strassler ed., 1996).
78. BRASSEY'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 125 (Franklin D.
Margiotta ed., 1994).
79. See CHARLES R.M.F. CRUrwELL, A HISTORY OFTHE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, 297-98
(1934).
80. See generally JAMES DUGAN & CAROLL STEWART, PLOESTI: THE GREAT GROUND-AIR
BATTLE OF 1 AUGUST 1943 (1962).
81. Deuteronomy 20:19-20 (NRSV).

82. HUGO GROTIUS,ON THE LAW OFWAR AND PEACE 747 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., William
S. Hein & Co., 1995) (1646).
83. See Protocol I, supra note 42.

84. See id. arts. 35(3) and 55.
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structures which contain dangerous forces." In addition, Protocol I
provides for "protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population. 86
Protocol I has not yet been ratified by the United States, although it
may nonetheless have weight as "developing customary international law,"
which is binding on all nations, regardless of whether they are
signatories. 7 Indeed, the Army's field manual, "The Law of Land
Warfare," recognizes as customary international law some of the very
principles set out in Protocol I.88 For example, the manual defines
"permissible objects of attack" as including only combatants and "objects
which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage."8' 9 Identical language appears in Protocol I'
1. General Protection of the Natural Environment
The provisions of Protocol I make significant advances to protect the
environment itself from the effects of conventional warfare. It prohibits
wartime damage to the environment itself even when the environment is
a target qualifying as military necessity under the traditional rules of jus
in belli discussed above.
Protocol I pertains to the natural environment, which suggests an
intrinsic value approach to environmental protection, but as we will see,
it also extends to a consideration of human interests. 91 Articles 35(3) and
55(1) of Protocol I set forth prohibitions against causing widespread, long-

85. See id. art. 56.
86. Id. art. 54.
87. John E. Parkerson, Jr., United States Compliance With HumanitarianLaw Respecting
CiviliansDuring OperationJust Cause, 133 MIL L. REV. 31, 52 (1991). According to Simonds,
"[a] Joint Chiefs of Staff expert identified Article 35(1) (the right of the parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited) and Article 35(2) (prohibition on using
weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering) as customary international law." Simonds, supra note 52, at 177 n.52.
88. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956 and
change 1976) [hereinafter FM 27-10].
89. Id. I 40c (change 1976).
90. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 52(2).
91. See Simonds, supra note 52, at 173.
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term, and severe damage to the environment. These articles are set forth
below in full:
ARTICLE 35. Basic rules.
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.'
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment.93

ARTICLE 55. Protection of the natural environment.
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival
of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited."
One main difficulty with Articles 35(3) and 55(1) is that the criterion of
widespread, long-term, and severe damage is not well defined. The
conjunctive use of the terms widespread, long-term, and severe clearly
contemplates a high threshold of damage before its prohibitions are
implicated. According to the negotiating history of Protocol I:
[L]ong-term was considered by some to be measured in decades.
Reference to twenty or thirty years were [sic] made by some
representatives as being a minimum. Others referred to battlefield
92. This is no more than a restatement of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; Article 22 of that document
states: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Hague IV
Convention, supra note 39, art. 22. It has generally been the case in the annals of military history,
as stated in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration on explosive projectiles, that "the only legitimate
object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of
the enemy." St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 55, pmbl.
93. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 35.
94. Id. art. 55.
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destruction in France in the First World War as being outside the
scope of the prohibition. [The article does not intend to prohibit
military actions which cause only short term damage to the
environment;] the period might be perhaps for ten years or more.
However, it is impossible to say with certainty what period of time
might be involved. It appeared to be a widely shared assumption
that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would
not normally be proscribed by this convention.95
This comment offers some elucidation, but offers little comfort for military
planners, because under this formulation they would need to assess in
advance whether damage will be long-term in terms of decades, and this
is an implausible sort of prediction except in extreme cases (such as the
deployment of radioactive or chemical weapons that are likely to adhere
to the environment for extended periods of time). It is clear, however, that
the requirement of widespread, long-term, and severe damage excludes the
much more common environmental damage associated with combat that
may be local, short-term, and less severe.
The German Military Manual construes the term, "widespread, longterm and severe damage" as "a major interference with human life or
natural resources which considerably exceeds the battlefield damage to be
regularly expected in a war."" This, while providing a subtle distinction
from the comment offered above, nonetheless is susceptible to the
criticism of vagueness. Reasonable people may readily differ as to what
degree of interference with human life might be deemed to considerably
exceed battlefield damage that is regularly expected in time of war.
Putting definitional problems to one side, even if environmental
damage caused by an attack is clearly not widespread, long-term, and
severe, that would not necessarily mean the attack is legal, particularly if
the destruction does not serve a clear and important military purpose. In
other words, if a military commander violates other principles of the
international law of war, such as jus in belli principles of military
necessity, proportionality and humanity, there may well be separate
grounds for finding the means or methods employed to be unlawful.
On first reading, Articles 35(3) and 55(1) might seem to significantly
overlap. But in fact, I think there is a distinction: 35(3) refers to situations
95. CDDHI/215/Rev. 1, 27, in 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE

ON

THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE

INARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA 1974-77, at 268-69 (Federal Political Department, Bern, 1978)
[hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS], cited in Simonds, supra note 52, at 173-74.
96. German Military Manual, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, DSK W 207320067,

Federal Ministry of Defence, 1992, at 37, §403.
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in which widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment is produced by the intentional employment of method or
means of warfare and where such results may be expected, that is, where
such results are foreseeable. The care clause of 55(1) suggests, I think, a
supervening standard or a general governing principle of due care in
military deployments. That is, it seems to require that the effects or
repercussions of permitted deployments (methods or means of warfare that
are not intended and which would not be expected to cause widespread,
long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment) do not end up
escalating or otherwise producing the prohibited effects.
However, it is also apparent that the remainder of Article 55(1) presents
a certain ambiguity that makes for confusion with Article 35(3). That is,
Article 35(3) establishes the threshold of the prohibited damage to be
"widespread, long-term and severe," while the threshold in Article 55(1)
is "widespread, long-term and severe. . . and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.'97 Article 35(3) sets forth a defining
limit based on concern for the environment qua environment, conferring
an intrinsic value principle on the environment, without regard to other
considerations, while Article 55(1) adds a clause that takes into account
the extent to which the widespread, long-term, and severe environmental
damage will impact the population, thus suggesting an anthropocentric
approach. This seems to be problematic on its face. Does the latter
provision make for a stricter standard or a lesser standard? Does it require
commanders to take into account, in addition to or instead of the
environment qua environment, the impact the strategy would have on the
population? Apparently, this ambiguity was an intentional feature of
Protocol I in an effort of the drafters to appease two competing camps,
those who supported the intrinsic value theory and those who believed the
environment should be evaluated principally based on anthropocentric
considerations and who therefore sought to model the provision in terms
of human harms. 98
One commentator on Protocol I states:
[Articles] 35(3) and 55 will not impose any significant limitation on
combatants waging conventional warfare. [They are] primarily
directed to high level policy decision makers and would affect such

97. Protocol I, supra note 42, arts. 35(3), 55(l) (emphasis added).
98. See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 61, at 1062.
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unconventional means of warfare as the massive use of herbicides
or chemical agents which could produce widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment.99
I am not sure this is a correct analysis, given that the prohibitions on the
use of chemical and biological agencies have been dealt with separately in
the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions of 1972 and 1993.00
The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a report on the military implications of
Protocol I, concluding that the convention on the whole is "militarily
unacceptable" because its restrictions "would protect targets that would
generally be considered legitimate military objectives under customary
international law."' 0 ' Military planners would not be able to balance
civilian losses against the military value of certain targets if the threshold
level of damage would result. "If severe losses would result, then the
attack is forbidden, no matter how important the target."' 2 This criticism
is echoed in the U.S. Army's OperationalLaw Handbook, which states
that "once the degree of damage to the environment reaches a certain level,
[the prohibition] does not employ the traditional balancing of military
necessity against the quantum of expected destruction. Instead, it
establishes this level as an absolute ceiling of permissible destruction. '0 3
This is a correct criticism. Articles 35(3) and 55(1) can, in some cases,
override the traditional principles of military necessity, proportionality and
humanity. Once the methods or means of warfare are intended, or may be
expected, to cause environmental damage reaching a certain threshold
characterized as widespread, long-term, and severe, the activity in question
violates either Article 35(3) or 55(1). Thus, the methods or means
contemplated or deployed would be unlawful under Protocol I.C No other
considerations, such as military advantage to be gained by the deployment,
nor a regard of whether an alternative operation would result in greater
casualties to civilians or collateral damage to civilian property, can trump
the prohibition of Articles 35(3) and 55(1). In other words, once the
threshold is reached, the action violates the prescriptions even if it is
militarily necessary and clearly proportional under traditional balancing
tests. This is troubling in that there may be human concerns, military
99.

MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL, NEw RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 348 (1982).

100. See generally Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 70; Chemical Weapons
Convention, supra note 69.
101. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1082 (quoting Ambassador George Aldrich, U.S.

negotiator of Protocol I).
102. Id.
103. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 5-18 (1997)
[hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].

104. See id.
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advantages notwithstanding, that outweigh the environmental protection
contemplated by this provision.
Any time the law confers autonomous value to the environment, there
is the risk that safeguarding it will come into conflicts with other concerns
of civilized peoples. Well-meaning efforts to enhance environmental
protection by emphasizing the intrinsic value of the environment may well
have the opposite effect. To override the balancing test of proportionality
and to foreclose military modes and methods of action could put the
civilian population at greater risk and result in disproportionate human
harms. Does the international community really wish to adopt an approach
that would sacrifice human interests to environmental ones? Would it ever
be appropriate to sacrifice human values for environmental ones?
If commanders relied upon Article 35(3)'s omission of any reference
to the human consequences of environmental damages, it is quite plausible
that military choices may end up killing more people so as to avoid
damage to certain environmentally fragile areas. For example, if a
commander decided to launch an attack to advance through a populated
area, based on military necessity, to pursue an important military target on
the other side of the populated area, a choice needs to be made. Either
advance directly through the populated region, disrupting and perhaps
destroying or killing people in the path, or advance around the populated
center but end up potentially decimating fragile ecological lands. If
Protocol I were strictly followed, the military course of action may require
avoiding the ecological lands and pressing through, instead, the populated
zone. Such a choice would likely inflame enemy emotions because of the
human lives and homes that were disrupted by the incursion.
Or, to use another example, if creating a scorched-earth situation by
destroying ecologically sensitive forests, as a way of obstructing access to
the enemy, is the only practical means to prevent them from attacking a
civilian population on the other side of the forest, are we to say that this
means is prohibited because it might cause widespread, long-term; and
severe damage, and that the environmental values outweigh the human
values? Should the environment be protected at all costs with no human
considerations at all, without reference to any balancing test? That is
exactly what the difficulty is with Article 35(3) - that it allows for an
interpretation that grants autonomous, intrinsic value for the environment
as a separate interest worthy of protection, and does so in a way that places
it at cross purposes with specific human interests. Once the level of
damage is expected to reach the threshold level the action is prohibited
regardless of countervailing human considerations. It seems that humans,
just as well as the environment, are and ought to be regarding as having
intrinsic value. Humans are as much an integral part of the global
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/2
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ecosystem as are plants, other animals, and the natural environment
broadly construed. On what basis can we defend a proposition that makes
human beings less worthy of protection than various elements of the
ecosystem? The fact remains that tradeoffs, often dreadful in their results,
must be calculated, weighed and balanced as a fundamental and
responsible element of decision making in warfare.
On the other hand, these concerns may be overblown. The provisions
of Protocol I mandate a three-part test that is not likely to be breached
except in the most egregious of circumstances. It may be hard to imagine
that in the scorched-earth example above that in fact the destruction of the
forest would be deemed widespread, long-term, and severe, given that
reforestation can take place within a few decades, or given that the region
itself might not be large enough to be deemed widespread.
2. Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces
Article 56 of Protocol I contains a somewhat specific prohibition
whereby "dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical power generating stations"
are legally protected from attack if "the release of dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population" might result.'05
This protection from attack applies even if the facility is a valid military
objective. Article 56(1) forbids attacking "military objectives located at or
in the vicinity of these works or installations ...if such attack may cause

the release of dangerous forces."" This "special protection against" attack
is forfeited if the dam or dike is used for purposes "other than its normal
function and in regular, significant and direct support of military
operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support."1 ° As to nuclear plants, attack is permissible only if the facility
"provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of
military operations" and the only way to cut off that support is through
attack.) °0

The enumeration of "dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating
stations" was intended to be exhaustive by the drafters of Protocol IVo9
One wonders why oil tankers and offshore oil terminals and platforms
were not included on the list, or chemical and biological weapons
production facilities. Perhaps a more comprehensive list of protected sites
might be advanced should there be a Fifth Geneva Convention in the
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
n.375.

Protocol 1,supra note 42, art. 56, 1.
Id.
Id. art. 56, 1 2(a) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 56, 12(b).
See OmcIAL RECORDS, supra note 95, 1 326, cited in Schmitt, supra note 18, at 78
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future, to extend this constraint to oil reserves, oil terminals and so on,
given the Gulf War experience of Iraq's setting ablaze of oil wells.
It has been suggested that Article 56 has not yet gained acceptance as
customary international law." At any rate, the hurdles to be overcome
before an attack may be permitted against a dam, dike, or nuclear electrical
plant are quite high. Furthermore, the provision that facilities are protected
if attacking them would produce consequent severe losses among the
civilian population contemplates a low threshold of loss for the protection
to be in effect. The ICRC Commentary clarified the term, "consequent
severe losses" to mean "important" or "heavy.""' This suggests that
attacks that are unimportant or light would be okay.
A further hurdle pertains to the provision of Article 56 that dams and
dikes must be used for other than their intended purposes and their support
for the enemy effort must be regular, significant and direct, in order for a
combatant to justify attacking them. Clearly the criteria stated are in the
conjunctive, so that even if support of a dam for the enemy military's
operations is direct and substantial and attack is the only option, if the
support is irregular rather than regular, an attack on the facility would be
unlawful. The ICRC Commentary provides clarification of this provision
of Article 56: "regular" implies a time frame that is not "accidental or
sporadic," "significant" is less precise than regular, but implies support
that is more than "negligible" or "merely an incidental circumstance," and
"direct" means "not in an intermediate or roundabout way."112
Nuclear generating stations have a similar protection as accorded dams
and dikes, except that they need not be used for other than their normal
function in order to be lawfully attacked. In other words, nuclear plants
have a lesser protection from attack than dams and dikes.
A separate concern in evaluating an attack of Article 56 targets is that
military planners must consider whether a proposed attack may cause
severe losses. Almost any proposed course of military deployment may
cause severe losses. This may inhibit planners from proposing merely a
moderate or otherwise cautious course of action on a sensitive military
target such as a dam or dike, because even such a cautious approach may

110. See Leibler, supra note 41, at 109.
111. INTERNATIONAL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 2154 (Yves

Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY] ("[Als so often in this Chapter, this
concept is a matter of common sense and it must be applied in good faith on the basis of objective
elements such as proximity of inhabited areas, the density of population, the lie of the land, etc.").
112. See id. at 671, 2162.
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cause severe damage to the civilian population, albeit in an unforeseeable
manner. As such, this clause of Article 56 has an inhibitory effect on
commanders.
Article 56 is one of the provisions of Protocol I that the United States
opposed. The objection centers on the language that contains restrictions
on attacking dangerous works and installations. The protections of the
civilian population, it is asserted, already exist by virtue of the principle
of proportionality." 3 "From the U.S. perspective, setting the threshold for
attack so high invites the enemy to use protected facilities for military
purposes.""' 4 Considering the complex range of factors that go into
assessing whether the criteria are or are not met, the attacker opens its state
to international reproach if other states disagree with the assessment.
"Given the multiplicity of criteria and their inherent subjectivity, it would
be very difficult to cite an action [against dams, dikes, and nuclear
electrical power stations] that would be objectively permissible.""' 5
It also appears that Article 56 "forbids any attack that raises the
possibility of severe civilian losses."'" 6 The objection seems to be that it
would no longer be permissible to engage in the proportionality principle,
which is a sacred tenet of the doctrine of military necessity, and generally
permits severe civilian losses if commanders justify them by comparing,
evaluating, calculating, and balancing the military advantage against
humanitarian concerns.
I am not so sure the preceding objection, that Article 56 forbids any
attack that raises the possibility of severe civilian losses, is correct. For
one thing, rather than rejecting them, Article 56 impliedly incorporates the
principles of military necessity and proportionality, so that commanders
retain a wide latitude in targeting the enumerated objectives - dams,
dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations - and even broader
latitude in attacking other installations that are not enumerated, such as
those used to make chemical or biological weapons. Furthermore, the
prohibition only pertains to situations in which attacking dams, etc., would
result in civilian losses that are severe. In other words, "only attacks with
dramatic consequences are forbidden.""' 7 Thus, to a large extent,
Article 56 essentially codifies the already operative proportionality
principle. That is, dramatic consequences, or severe consequences, are
precisely what a prudent military commander would take into account in
113. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 80.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. GURUSWAMY ETAL, supra note 37, at 1082 (quoting Ambassador George Aldrich, U.S.
negotiator of Protocol I).
117. Schmitt, supra note 18, at 80.
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a proportionality assessment. Severe civilian casualties would be justified,
under the proportionality test if and only if the effort contributes to wiping
out the enemy's regular, significant, and direct advantage obtained from
the targeted dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations. It
appears that Article 56 simply seeks to do with greater specificity what the
proportionality test does in general principle, and that the aforementioned
objection is not well taken.
Moreover, in any military deployment, given the inherently subjective
assessment that military planners face in applying the proportionality and
necessity tests to the particular state of affairs, given the inherent need for
flexibility and agility, given the setbacks and surprises that are inevitable
in combats, and given that unforeseen events such as bad weather can
complicate predictions - there is always the possibility, if not the
probability, that the actions will come under fire by other states that differ
in their (hindsight) assessment. On the other hand, given the precisionguided bombs and missiles that can be unleashed by military forces today,
given such notable military objectives as breaking up the opponent's will
to fight, cutting off leadership, and achieving psychological effects, given
the desirability of minimizing civilian casualties and of limiting damage
to the civilian infrastructure so as to help maintain stability after a war is
ended, and given highly sensitive political considerations that usually are
inherent in modern wars
military planners inevitably take great care
when applying the proportionality and necessity tests.
Protocol I has also been criticized as being a "vague, impractical,
unworkable.., effort to prevent all collateral ecological damage," and that
by prohibiting reprisals against noncombatant and environmental targets,
it removes the "best deterrent to illegal conduct in war."" 8 However, I
think that Protocol I does no more than place the burden on warring
nations to analyze the environmental implications of their military
operations and to avoid serious environmental harms, just as those nations
are bound to avoid injuries to noncombatants.
Protocol I, unlike ENMOD (discussed below), has an enforcement
mechanism. Protocol I defines several categories of "grave breaches":
making civilians "the object of attack"; launching an indiscriminate attack
against civilians or civilian objects; or attacking installations containing
dangerous forces knowing that the resulting harm will be excessive." 9
These violations could be considered war crimes, and as such would
require the state in which the offending party is found to prosecute the
-

118. Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of
Additional Protocol 1. 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 145, 148 (1985). The author also suggests that
Protocol I might forbid the first use of nuclear weapons. See id. at 166.
119. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 85,1 3(a)-(c).
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individual or 20group alleged to be culpable, or cooperate in extradition
proceedings.1
B. ENMOD
The ENMOD" was prompted by the U.S. use of chemical defoliants
to destroy forests and croplands in Vietnam, and by its efforts to
manipulate weather patterns over that country, among other things. This
is the first environment-specific law of armed conflict in history.
ENMOD is limited to a prohibition of the use of environmental
modification techniques as weapons of war. It does not nor was it intended
to regulate other means of warfare (such as nuclear or chemical weapons),
even though they might adversely affect the environment. Nor does it
pertain to conventional acts of warfare that inevitably, to varying degrees,
result in adverse effects on the environment.
The main thrust of ENMOD is its prohibition on the use of the
environment as a tool or weapon of warfare, but it does not address
damage to the environment directly or provide for protection of the
environment itself from collateral damage. Some critics think that
ENMOD is merely a "half-measure" and that it does not effectively
remove the danger of environmental warfare; it pertains to "mainly nonexistent or imaginary environmental modification techniques and
condones those which are feasible and, therefore, more likely to be used
in military operations.' ' 2
ENMOD in a sense is grounded in an intrinsic value framework in that
it takes it to be an environmental harm for the environment to be
manipulated in certain ways, apart from damage to human life or
resources. In fact, it is not concerned with adverse effects on the
environment as such, but simply the adverse use of the environment as a
means of warfare.
1. The Reality of Environmental Modification Techniques
ENMOD is somewhat forward-looking in that it pertains in part to
tactics that do not appear to be within present military capabilities. Direct
120. See id. art. 88.
121. ENMOD, supra note 60, arts. 1.1 & II.
122. See Josef Goldblat, The Environmental Warfare Convention; How Meaningful Is It?
(comments on the draft of ENMOD on behalf of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI)), reprinted at HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.
SENATE, ON CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF

ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, Oct. 3, 1978, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., at p. 69
[hereinafter HEARING].
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environmental warfare, such as harnessing the forces of nature for hostile
purposes, has been a malevolent, though largely ineffectual, military desire
throughout history. Control over the forces of nature for the achievement
of military aims has been a human fantasy since the beginning of history.
The ancient Greeks envied Zeus' ability to hurl thunderbolts. Moses was
said to have been able to control the Red Sea in such a way as to drown the
Egyptian forces that were pursuing the Israelites.'23 Joshua claimed to have
caused the Sun to stand still
so that the Israelites could consummate a
24
Anamites.1
the
with
battle
The Understanding relating to Article H1 of ENMOD states that certain
specified phenomena produced by hostile environmental modification
techniques are per se outlawed.'25 According to the Understanding, these
environmental modification techniques are per se illegal because it is
understood that all these phenomena "would result, or could reasonably be
expected to result, in widespread, long-lasting, or severe destruction,
damage or injury."' 12' The Understanding refers to "earthquakes, tsunamis;
an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types, tornadic storms); changes
in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the
ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere."' 27 The list is
intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive - thus, the use of techniques
producing other phenomena could also be appropriately included, such as
volcanic eruptions, tectonic plate movements, sea level 2changes,
lightning,
8
hail, and changes in the energy balance of the planet.
Many think that ENMOD is impractical and little more than windowdressing since as a matter of fact, military planners only rarely employ
environmental modification techniques because they do not generally view
environmental manipulation as a promising operational technique. This is
coupled with the fact that there is a paucity of research or development in
environmental modification techniques. 2 9 On the other hand, in the future,
as technology advances, ENMOD may become a front burner issue in
123. Exodus 14:27-28.
124. Joshua 10:12-13.
125. Understanding Relating to Article 1I, Report of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess, Supp. No. 27, at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/3 1/27 (1976), available
at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/environ i.htm (last visited June 11, 2003).
126. Id. 2.
127. Id. l.
128. Id. 3.
129. See Hans Blix, Arms Control Treaties Aim at Reducing the Military Impact on the
Environment in ESSAYS ININTERNATIONAL LAW N HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 703,709

(Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984) (discussing the idea of melting the Arctic ice cover in order to raise
the level of the sea, thereby flooding coastal regions).
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terms of environmental concerns of warfare. For example, if future
advances in the technology of precipitation modification should make this
technology so effective as to cause widespread, long-lasting, or severe
effects in a militarily useful way, its use would come under the
prohibitions of ENMOD. The use of herbicides, which was widespread
during the Vietnam War, appears likely to be prohibited by ENMOD in the
event such use would produce widespread, long-lasting, or severe
effects. 3 ' Negotiators of the convention believed that the use of chemical
herbicides in a region would upset the ecological balance so that "the use
of such techniques would, at a minimum, have widespread effects."''
Scientists are perhaps on the brink of developing sophisticated
technical know-how to control large-scale factors of the environment for
effective military purposes. 32 Future technology is likely to relate to the
science "devoted to the detection, tracking and generation of possible
responses to an external threat to this planet, [such as] asteroids, comets,
and meteors that may collide with or otherwise affect the Earth. 3 3 Such
technology may well include kinetic energy or laser systems some of
which may be based in outer space. 134 Future technology may allow
military planners to engage in environmental warfare that would involve
damage-causing manipulations of: (a) celestial bodies or outer space; (b)
the atmosphere (including stripping of the ozone layers over targeted
regions so as to inflict lethal doses of ultraviolet radiation on the region);
(c) the land (lithosphere) by means of manipulation of tectonic plates so
as to cause earthquakes; (d) the oceans (hydrosphere) by means of

130. See HEARING, supra note 122, at 94.

131. Id. It is unlikely that chemical herbicides would be used in armed conflict in the wake of
the Vietnam War experience.
As indicated by the adoption of Resolution 2603 of the UN General Assembly in
1969, the great majority of parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 [(the Gas
Protocol)] believed that the Protocol prohibited the use in armed conflict of
chemical herbicides. The United States has never accepted that interpretation, but
in 1975, in connection with U.S. ratification of the Protocol, President Ford
renounced as a matter of national policy the first use of herbicides in war except
... domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or
around their immediate defensive perimeters.
Id.
132.
133.
119, 120
134.

Yuzon, supra note 47, at 795.
John C. Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 A.F. L. REV.
(1997).
Id. at 128.
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manipulation of seabed tectonic plates to produce tsunami waves (i.e.,
seismic sea waves) that in turn would wipe out coastal regions; and (e) the
biota (biosphere), either terrestrial or marine.
a. Celestial Bodies and Outer Space
Celestial bodies refers to the moon and other planetary satellites, the
planets themselves, the sun and other stars, asteroids, meteors, comets, and
so on. In recent years there has been fanciful as well as real concern about
the Earth itself being threatened by asteroids, meteors, and the like.' 35
These concerns in turn have spawned defensive preparations aimed at
manipulating celestial bodies that might be on a trajectory to collide with
the Earth. Both nuclear weapon deployment, laser interference, and other
means have been proposed. As such technology advances, military
planners might be tempted to employ such technology for the hostile use
of manipulation of celestial bodies, for instance, to divert asteroids so as
to cause them to strike enemy territory.
b. The Atmosphere
It is plausible that techniques might be developed in the future to make
it possible to alter the electrical properties of the ionosphere (the upper
atmosphere about eighty to a few hundred kilometers from the Earth's
surface) so as to disrupt enemy communications.' 36 However, military
commanders presently have at hand jamming technologies that would
seem to obviate the need for such a strategy. More plausible would be the
possibility of opening regional and temporary holes "in the ozone layer
above enemy territory for the purpose of permitting an injurious level of
ultraviolet radiation to penetrate to the ground, perhaps by the controlled
release of a bromide compound from orbiting satellites."' 37 In addition,
"[v]arious levels of control over winds (e.g., creation or redirection of
hurricanes), over clouds (e.g., creation or dissolution of fog, generation of
cloud-to-ground lightning), and over precipitation (e.g., production of
torrential rains, heavy snowfall, massive hail) could bring about direct or
indirect damage to an enemy."'138 The notion of cloud dispersal, if feasible
over an extended period of time, could produce famine in a targeted
region. The effective control of winds still remains beyond scientific
capability. Controlling clouds for hostile purposes (such as disrupting
135. See id. at 119-20.
136. Yuzon, supra note 47, at 795.
137. Arthur H. Westing, ed., Environmental Warfare: An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL
WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POuCY APPRAISAL 5 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).

138. Id.
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regional weather patterns through cloud seeding), remains at a marginal
level of technology, but was used in the Vietnam War.
c. The Lithosphere
Manipulation of land masses to produce landslides (soil and rock
avalanches), snow avalanches in arctic or alpine regions, or earthquakes,
are techniques that are within technological capability, and given the right
conditions could be initiated with hostile intent. One conceivable method
for triggering earthquakes is to inject a lubricant into a fault area, allowing
adjacent plates to slip.' 39 "This was discovered in Colorado, where
earthquakes were triggered by the disposal of liquid waste in deep wells.
It was also discovered that the extent of slip could be controlled by
'pinning' the block in some places by pumping liquid out of the fault
region." 4 Of course, development of such techniques could be helpful for
humanitarian purposes, namely, to relieve strain by producing several lowmagnitude earthquakes. 4 '
d. The Hydrosphere
The Earth's oceans cover seventy-one percent of the surface, and thus
could play a major role in any war. "Among the hostile ocean
modifications that have been suggested as military possibilities ... are
physical or chemical manipulations . . . to disrupt acoustic (sonar) or
electromagnetic properties of the attacked waters."' 42 This in turn would
disrupt "enemy underwater communication, remote sensing, navigation
and missile-guidance systems."'43 Another possibility is the creation of
tsunamis to destroy cities and offshore facilities; such a tsunami can be
produced by setting off a nuclear device in an appropriate location
underwater.'44
A common and conventional method of offensive and defense warfare
consists of targeting dams, dikes, and other bodies of water held in check
by levees or other barriers, by breaching the barrier.'45 Certain simple
technology could provide the opportunity to divert waters of a river so as
to deny its use to a downstream enemy. Certain military actions can bring
139. See HEARING, supra note 122, at 90.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Westing, supra note 137, at 7.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 8.
145. As mentioned above, attacks on dams, dikes, and nuclear power plants are proscribed,
with narrow exceptions, under Protocol 1. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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about highly destructive floods, most straightforwardly by destroying
natural levees or constructed dikes and dams to release the water contained
behind them. Hundreds of levees and dikes throughout the world stand
ready to be attacked in time of war. Some of the most devastating
instances of environmental manipulation for military purposes in all of
human history have involved the breaching of barriers that keep in check
the potential energy of streams or other bodies of water. In 1672, the Dutch
opened their dikes in order to stem the tide of the advancing French forces
in the Third Franco-Dutch War, and created the so-called Holland Water
Line. 4 6 In the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 the Chinese engaged
in intentional military flooding in order to curtail the Japanese advance.
They dynamited the Huayuankow dike of the Yellow River, thereby
drowning several thousand Japanese soldiers, and stopped their advance
along this front. However, in the process, the flood waters ravaged major
portions of adjacent provinces, inundating several million hectares of
farmland, flooding more than four thousand Chinese villages, and
drowning at least several hundred thousand Chinese as a result, with
several million more being left homeless. It was not until 1947 that the
river was brought back under control. 47 During the Korean War, U.S.
forces pursued a policy of attacking dams in North Korea. The destruction
of irrigation dams was considered by the United States to be among the
most successful of its air operations of the Korean War. 48 Nuclear power
stations or related facilities could be damaged so as to release their
radioactive contents into the surroundings. It is also possible to deploy
technology to awaken quiescent volcanoes.
e. The Biosphere
The biosphere consists of numerous interrelated ecosystems, ranging
from forests, prairies, tundra, croplands, and marine life. These systems
can be disrupted in various ways, including: (i) by applying chemical
poisons, herbicides and other means to target forests and other vegetation;
(ii) by introducing exotic living organisms such as bacteriological agents;
(iii) by incendiary means (e.g. earth scorching); and (iv) by mechanical
means.' 49 Forests can be devastated by spraying them with herbicides, as
was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. Large tracks of land can be
decimated by initiating self-propagating wildfires. Biological agents such
146. See ARTHUR H. WESTING, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: THE MILITARY IMPACT ON
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 14-19 (1980) tbl. 1.2 (setting forth "ecologically destructive wars").

147. See id. at 6.
148. See id. at 7.
149. See id. at 8.
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as anthrax, if introduced into a regional ecosystem, can render the area
uninhabitable for an extended period of time. That in fact happened when
the United Kingdom used the Scottish island of Gruinard during 1941-42
for testing the military potential of bacillus anthracis, the causative agent50
of anthrax. The island remains dangerously contaminated to this day.'
Marine ecosystems can be severely disrupted with hostile intent by
destroying offshore wells or loaded oil tankers (and other bulk carriers of
poisonous cargoes). Recovery from such disruption, particularly if on a
massive scale, could take several years. Further disruption could occur by
releasing radioactive elements into the marine environment by the
destruction of nuclear-powered ships.
If in the future science will provide environmental modification
techniques that have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects and which
seem suitable for effective military use, it remains uncertain whether such
techniques can be employed under wartime conditions in a manner which
is sufficiently predictable and controllable that they can serve as effective
weapons. In any event, even if such techniques were developed, it is
unlikely that the effects of such weapons could be made sufficiently
proportionate to their military advantages so as to comply with the laws of
war, and their military, applications would likely violate ENMOD as well.
Military planners would likely be dissuaded from using such techniques
not only because of the potential violation of law, but because the military
applications of such weapons might well be accomplished more effectively
with current weapon systems.
2. The Terms and Provisions of ENMOD
ENMOD is the only international document that outlaws techniques
deployed specifically for the purpose of modification of the ecological
balance of a region for the purpose of military strategy. ENMOD applies
if two requirements are met simultaneously: (a) hostile intent (b) to cause
destruction, damage or injury at, or above, a certain threshold of
damage. 5 ' ENMOD also makes it unlawful to assist, encourage or induce
other nations to engage in such activities.' 52 ENMOD forbids the use or
manipulation of the forces of the environment as weapons, not only during
hostilities, but even when there is no overt conflict. The prohibitions of
ENMOD are absolute in that no military necessity or proportionality

150. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1084.

151. ENMOD, supra note 60, art. 1.1.
152. Id. art. 1.2.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

37

LAW4 [2003], Art. 2
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OFLaw,
Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Vol. 15, Iss.

(Vol. 15

balancing may override or justify a breach of its terms. The United States
is a party to ENMOD, and has also renounced environmental modification
techniques as a matter of policy.'53
ENMOD stands in contrast with Protocol I, for whereas Protocol I
addresses intentional and foreseeable damage to the environment as a
consequence of modes of warfare, ENMOD directs its concern to the
direct modification of the environment itself as a method or means of
warfare. 5' That is, Protocol I contains prohibitions on damaging, as
opposed to using, the environment.
ENMOD provides in part:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as a means of
destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party.
[T]he term "environmental modification techniques" refers to any
technique for changing - through deliberate manipulation of
natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere,
or of outer space.' 55
The same terms, "widespread," "long-term," and "severe" are in Protocol
I, but appear in ENMOD in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive.
Since these appear to have become agreed-upon terms of art it would seem
that they would share a common interpretation. However, their meaning
has been variously interpreted by the U.S. Army, the German government,
153. Terry, supra note 50, at 64. According to some authorities, there has been no active
research effort into weather modification by the Department of Defense since 1979. See Barry B.
Coble, Benign Weather Modification 3 (1997) (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies),
available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_:Theses/Coble/coble.pdf (last visited
June 11, 2003). "The Air Force spends no money on research, and there is no effort to monitor
civilian research, applications, and advancements.... Efforts to modify the weather for battle
purposes are not being pursued." Id. (citing Stanley A. Changnon, Jr. & W. Henry Lambright, The
Rise and Fall of Federal Weather Modification Policy, 19 J. WEATHER MODIFICATION 3 (1987)).
Of course, there are also environmental modification effects that conceivably may be beneficial to
the American people and to the world at large, and there appears to be no reason not to support its
development and use for peaceful, humanitarian purposes. The United States carries on its research
and development activities on environmental modification techniques on an unclassified basis. The
same cannot be said for other countries.
154. Richard A. Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR, 38, 39-40 (G. Plant ed., 1992).
155. ENMOD, supra note 60, arts. 1.1, II.
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the drafters of Protocol I, and the ENMOD signatories. This variation
complicates application of the environmental law of war.
Clearly, ENMOD adopts a more stringent standard of protection than
Protocol I because the terms, "widespread, long-lasting or severe,"
sometimes referred to as the "troika" provision, are in the disjunctive,
rather than the conjunctive framework of Protocol 1.156 The presence of
only one of the three criteria - widespread, long-lasting, or severe - is
enough for the environmental modification technique to be deemed
outlawed, whereas the provisions of Protocol I activate, as mentioned
above, only when all three criteria are met. Thus, under ENMOD, causing
any one of them, without more, is forbidden.
On the other hand, ENMOD, while providing a low threshold of harm
for violations, applies only to a narrow range of circumstances. Its
proscriptions extend only to cases involving manipulation of natural
processes. That is, it contemplates environmental modification techniques
that can be channeled in a fairly selective way to a particular target.
.In an Understanding Regarding Article I of ENMOD by the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament, there was some degree of specification
offered as to the meaning of the terms "widespread, long-lasting or severe"
(the troika clause):
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of
this Convention, the terms "widespread," "long-lasting" and
"severe" shall be interpreted as follows:
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometres;
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or
approximately a season;
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm
to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is
intended exclusively for this Convention and is not intended to
prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms
if used in
57
agreement.
international
other
any
with
connexion

156. Id. art. 1.1 (emphasis added).
157. Understanding Relating to Article I,Report of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 27, at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976),
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/environl.htm (last visited June 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Understanding I].
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By contrast, Protocol I provides little guidance on the meaning and scope
of the terms, "widespread, long-lasting and severe," other than some
reference by delegates to "long-term as a period measured in decades."''
This unclear definition in Protocol I is one of several reasons why the
United States and other countries have not ratified it. 159 Note the definition
of long-lasting in ENMOD ("lasting for a period of months, or
approximately a season") is significantly more stringent than the period of
decades alluded to in the interpretation of Protocol .60 It appears clear that
the damage caused to the environment in Kuwait and neighboring
countries during the Gulf War was not widespread, long-term, and severe
under Protocol I, because the environmental damage did not persist for
decades, as contemplated by delegates to that convention. Also, by
defining "severe" as "serious or significant" and by using the term
"disruption" instead of "damage," ENMOD provides a greater protection
than Protocol 1.161
While the term "severe" in Protocol I refers to "damage" to the
environment, the same term in ENMOD applies its prohibition, as
62
indicated in the Understanding quoted above, to mere disruption.
Furthermore, whereas Protocol I is measured in terms of damage to the
natural environment, ENMOD includes injury to economic resources and
other assets. Protocol I and ENMOD standards are clearly separate and
distinct, as made clear in the disclaimer set forth in the ENMOD
Understanding that "the interpretation set forth... is intended exclusively
for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of
the same or similar terms if used in connection with any other international
63
agreement."
As mentioned, ENMOD prohibits environmental manipulations only
when they are carried out with the deliberate intent to change natural
processes for hostile purposes as a means of damage, destruction or injury.
Thus, it does not deal with environmental modification techniques that are
nonmilitary, nonhostile, or non-deliberate, however damaging they may
prove to be. All nonhostile, nonmilitary, or non-deliberate environmental
modification techniques, however damaging they may be or may prove to
be, are simply not addressed by the convention. Thus, such nonhostile
military uses as fog dispersal to facilitate the landing or takeoff of allied
aircraft, or to clear enemy targets to be bombed, are permissible since this
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 61, at 1065.
See id.
Understanding I, supra note 157.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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does not constitute manipulation of the environment as a means of
destruction, damage, or injury. It is simply to enhance or facilitate the use
of other weapons in producing destruction, damage or injury, and does not
violate the convention.
Equally permissible are hostile uses that produce destructive effects
below the troika threshold. Thus, certain environmental modification
techniques that produce more limited effects and which therefore fall short
of the threshold are permissible. For example, precipitation modification
which falls short of changing the weather pattern in a severe, serious, or
significant way, such as was used by U.S. forces in Vietnam, would be
permissible even though deployed with hostile intent in a selected area
pursuant to tactical military operations.' 64
While ENMOD contains restrictions on the use of environmental
modification techniques for hostile purposes, it also prohibits research and
experimentation of environmental modification for hostile purposes. In
fact, it is difficult or impossible to draw a distinction between a state's
peacetime and hostile research, and often enough they are inextricably
linked to national security. At any rate, the convention does not proscribe
the peaceful development and use of environmental modification
techniques, such as precipitation modification projects or projects to
protect the planet from run-ins with asteroids, comets, and the like. If a
nation seeks to alleviate a drought by cloud seeding and, as a consequence,
produces a devastating flood of severe consequences, this nonhostile use
would not be a violation of the convention. Likewise, if a nation, in an
effort to experiment with manipulation of tectonic plates in order to better
understand the etiology of earthquakes and how to predict them, triggered
a massive earthquake, this nonhostile environmental event would not be
unlawful under the convention.
As a practical matter it may not always be clear whether the use of an
environmental modification technique, assuming it is with hostile purpose,
has for its objective the intention to change natural processes to cause
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects on the enemy. It may be
difficult to establish such deliberate intention in the absence of an
admission by the perpetrator. That is, ENMOD "would allow a State to
fully escape responsibility by asserting a lack of intention in causing"
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects on the enemy.' 65
Thus, at least one commentator suggests that there should be strict
liability for all intended damage, as well as foreseeable excessive damage,
if a state deploys an environmental modification technique as a means of
164. GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 37, at 1058.

165. Yuzon, supra note 47, at 807.
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warfare."6 The idea here is that ENMOD should be strengthened by
deleting the qualifying phrase "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects"
from Article I. That would result in a convention that prohibits use of these
techniques whether or not the effects are widespread, long-lasting, or
severe. For this reason, it would be more effective in protecting the
environment from hostile action than would the existing convention. It
should be pointed out that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, prohibiting the
use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, makes no distinction
between quantitatively more and less severe effects caused by these
weapons. Similarly, critics want environmental modification techniques
that are undisputedly covered by ENMOD to be prohibited without regard
to the degree of damage that ensues.
Even assuming that hostile intent has been proved (which may not be
at all a straightforward matter), the convention does not proscribe the
hostile use of environmental modification techniques over a smaller area,
of shorter duration or of less severity than set forth in the Understanding
Related to Article I. It would not be illegal, according to the
Understanding, to devastate an area smaller than several hundred square
kilometers, or to cause adverse effects lasting for a period of weeks instead
of months, or less than a season; or to bring about disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets, which are not
severe, serious, or significant, whatever these subjective terms might mean
to different states that consider the question. Thus, weather modification
techniques such as cloud seeding, presently available to military planners,
may be deployed with hostile purposes, because it is doubtful whether that
would produce widespread, long-lasting, or severe disruption.
It is important to note that countries of different sizes, of different
population densities or at different stages of economic development, would
no doubt have a different assessment of how these terms play out in the
warfare theater. A perpetrator's perception of the gravity of such acts may
not coincide with that of the victim. For example, Trinidad and Tobago
noted that the definitions of the terms "widespread, long-lasting or severe"
do not address themselves to the situation of small entities, such as the
islands of the Caribbean. 67
With respect to both ProtocolI and ENMOD, it is generally understood
that in assessing damage, the terms, "widespread," "long-lasting," and
"severe" take into account the cumulative effects of deployments rather
than individual actions, particularly when a series of actions are designed
to achieve a common, or closely related military objective.' 68 In other
166. Leibler, supra note 41, at 83.
•167. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1058.
168. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 83-84.
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words, while an individual combatant's mission might not, in and of itself,
produce widespread damage, it would be absurd to ignore the fact that the
single mission, coupled with the multiple missions of other combatants in
an integrated plan or operation, contributes to produce the ultimate
damage.
The ban under ENMOD applies to the conduct of military operations
during armed conflicts, as well as other hostile uses (whether by military
or nonmilitary personnel) when no other weapons are being deployed or
when there is no overt conflict. 6 9 It is applicable both to offense and
defense, and has no exceptions pertaining to geographical boundaries (e.g.,
it applies to hostile acts taken by a military unit within its own border to
manipulate its own environment). According to the Soviet and U.S.
sponsors of the text, the term "hostile" alone suffices as a criterion upon
which the convention's proscription is based.
ENMOD prohibits the employment of techniques producing
environmental modifications as a means of destruction, damage, or injury
to another state party. Thus, it allows hostile deployment that exceeds the
threshold if the target is not a state party to the convention. In other words,
the convention does not prohibit a state party from deploying
environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes, under
circumstances that would be prohibited under the convention, against
states that are not party to the convention. ENMOD only extends to cases
70
when the damage occurs on the territory of a state party.
It is interesting to note that some of the modes of warfare contemplated
by ENMOD - generating tsunami waves or earthquakes, for instance would likely violate the proportionality principle of traditional jus in belli
insofar as such actions are likely to produce indiscriminate and disastrous
environmental damage. Thus, in a sense ENMOD merely specifies what
the traditional jus in bei principles would already exact.
While the technology for exotic environmental modification is distant,
the potential for environmental warfare is still real. Conceivably
environmental warfare techniques could become an accepted means of
warfare. For example, if the means were at hand to cast a severe drought
on a region, with a view toward blockading a society and starving its
people to death, this could produce a "better" result than detonation of
nuclear weapons, which would serve to destroy structures, kill people and
livestock, and create radioactive contamination.
Unlike Protocol I, the provisions of ENMOD have no effective
enforcement or remedial mechanism for breaches, such as reparation or
169. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1056.
170. ENMOD. supra note 60, art. I.
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monetary compensation.'' Instead, any state party which has reason to
believe that any other state party is acting in breach of the convention's
obligations may lodge a complaint with the U.N. Security Council, which
will investigate the claim and make a report.172 Article V(2) requires the
U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Consultative Committee of Experts
at the request of any state. 173 However, ENMOD does not provide for any
civil or criminal liability. It remains to be seen whether the Consultative
Committee has more than insubstantial authority.'74
A further concern is that certain hostile modification techniques could
be carried out in such a manner as to be covert and undetectable by a
targeted state. An attack in the form of, for example, depleting the ozone
layer over a targeted state could affect the country for quite a long time,
until it might be too late to realize that it was under attack. Insofar as
lodging a complaint with the U.N. Security Council, a targeted state might
not be able to show or prove that changes that had harmed its environment
were other than natural fluctuations or a result of human activities in
another country. It might be equally difficult to prove whether the damage
was caused deliberately or with hostile intent by another state, or was just
an accidental result of peaceful uses of modification techniques. The
resolution of such concerns may devolve on the Consultative Committee
of Experts, which may need to engage in significant fact-finding inquiries
and garnering of expert views with regard to problems raised by a state
who requests its mobilization.
Neither Iraq nor Kuwait are parties to ENMOD. It is generally agreed
that the Iraqi techniques employed during the Gulf War did not violate the
prohibitions of ENMOD and would not have done so even had Iraq and
Kuwait been parties, because, while the environment was a target of sorts,75
its processes were not manipulated such that it constituted a weapon.'
However, there are less drastic ways of preventing the acquisition of oil by
an adversary (in and of itself a common military objective based on
necessity) than the actual destruction of oil fields and wells. 176 Moreover,
the Iraqi oil spills and fires inflicted damage that so outweighed possible
tactical gains that the acts were illegal under the customary international
law concepts of military necessity and proportionality. 177 The U.N.
171. See Simonds, supra note 52, at 187.
172. ENMOD, supra note 60, art. V.2.
173. Id.
174. Simonds, supra note 52, at 187 (asserting that the Consultative Committee of Experts is
relatively powerless).
175. But see Luis Kutner & Ved Nanda, Draft Indictment ofSaddam Hussein, 20 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 91, 95 (1991).
176. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 25.
177. Id. at 21.
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78
Security Council, in issuing Resolution 687, appeared to adopt this view. 1
This Resolution serves as precedent for the idea that, while a nation's
actions might not specifically violate ENMOD or Protocol I, the
international community can and will come together to impose sanctions
against egregious environmental harms inflicted in time of war, even
though they might not agree as to what legal principles apply.
Only one-third of nations are signatories to ENMOD, and fewer than
sixty percent have approved Protocol J. 179 Some nations have qualified
their ratification with weakening conditions. The legal norms that exist are
scattered, and are either very general and vague, as well as subject to
military necessity exceptions, or more specific and relevant, but not
directed at prevailing belligerent practices of the sort most likely to
generate environmental harm. Furthermore, the status and relevance of
principles of customary international law are quite indefinite, as is the
related matter of whether treaty norms reflect and embody customary
norms. 180
ENMOD, as it stands, permits some level of manipulation of the
environment for hostile purposes. The convention condones military
preparations for, and the actual perpetration of, these activities. In the
Twenty-First Century, with the environment being of ever increasing
concern, with the depletion of the ozone layer, and with widespread
evidence of global warming, there is no convincing reason why any hostile
modification techniques should be tolerated at all except, perhaps, the use
of modification techniques on a state's own territory to combat foreign
invasion. Even the right to use modification techniques on a state's own
territory to prevent foreign invasion (e.g., by producing massive landslides
or diverting bodies of water) might be legitimately challenged. Moreover,
given the fundamental importance of the environment for the well-being
of peoples of the world, there is no rational basis why ENMOD should be
limited to state parties. The provisions need to apply universally, and
ought to be considered part of customary international law given the
exigencies of an increasingly fragile environment coupled with the
capabilities of war powers even in conventional war settings.

C. Nuclear Weapons, ProtocolI and ENMOD
The tenor of war techniques has substantially changed since World War
H, when the moral imperative to prevent civilian deaths was balanced
178. But see id. at 27 (arguing that Iraq's liability arose from the invasion itself rather than
Iraq's actions during it).
179. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1054.
180. Falk, supra note 154, at 79.
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against the very survival of civilization itself.' Allied forces accordingly
justified the extensive bombing and demolition of Dresden and Tokyo.
The rationale behind the atomic bomb detonation of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was that many more civilian lives as well as Allied soldiers were
saved from what could have been a much more bloody offensive.
The consequences of a large-scale nuclear war would be disastrous to
the environment and would place in jeopardy the very survival of the
world's peoples. There has been widespread concern in the international
community addressing the profoundly adverse impact of nuclear war on
the regional and even global environment. Are nuclear weapons, per se,
unlawful under Protocol I or ENMOD?
It is uncontroversial to assert that the use of such weapons would
inevitably cause many unnecessary injuries, and that in itself may well
violate the law of war principles of military necessity, proportionality, and
humanity. Moreover, nuclear bombs would likely cause widespread, longterm, and severe damage to the environment, and thus seem to implicate
the prohibitions of Protocol I. On its face, Article 35(3) suggests that
weapons of mass destruction are prohibited, but this is far from assured."8 2
The argument that it does prohibit weapons of mass destruction is simply
that, by virtue of the textual language requiring that all three features of
environmental harm must be present for the prohibition to be applicable,
most contemplated uses of weapons of mass destruction would fall within
the ban.
However, the United States and other nuclear powers insist that since
there is no explicit prohibition of nuclear weapons, their use is
permitted." 3 An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
indicates that "existing international law relating to the protection and
safeguarding of the environment does not specifically prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons"; rather, international law only "indicates important
environmental factors that are properly to be taken into account in the
context of the implementation of the principles and rules of law applicable
in armed conflict"
e.g., the principles of necessity and
-

181. James Dao, Damage Control, Battle Plan: Spare Iraq's Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2003, at 4: 1.
182. Falk, supra note 154, at 39-40.
183. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1054. It is Army policy that, absent contrary
instructions from national command authority, field commanders who utilize nuclear weapons must
restrict noncombatant casualties to five percent at the margins. See DEPARTMENT OFTHE ARMY FM
101-3 1-1, STAFF OFFICERS' FIELD MANUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND
PROCEDURES (1977); see also NWP 9, supra note 42, at 10-1. As with other weapons, however,
even that amount of damage must not be disproportionate to the military advantage gained from
their use. GURUSWAMY ET AL, supra note 37, at 1054.
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proportionality. 84 The International Court of Justice further stated that it
"does not consider that the treaties in question [Protocol I and ENMOD]
could have intended to deprive a State. of the exercise of its right of selfdefence under international law because of its obligations to protect the
environment."'' 85 Thus, for purposes of self-defense the deployment of
nuclear weapons would not necessarily violate the provisions of Protocol
I, notwithstanding that such weapons clearly cause pervasive and
devastating effects upon the natural environment. If a state's very right of
existence hangs in the balance, a state's right of self-defense is not limited
by its environmental and humanitarian obligations. In considering the
proportionality principle, in which a military operation is prohibited if it
is probable that it will result in damage to the environment which is
excessive in relation to the military gain which the operation is expected
to produce - commanders may well conclude that if the very survival of
a state is in jeopardy, the deployment of a nuclear weapon would not be
excessive in relation to the military gain that is expected from the
operation.
D. Nonlethal, "Humane" Weapons
As early as 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was encouraged to
consider the use of nonlethal, "humane," weapons that the Pentagon
86
believed could be developed and poised for action by military planners.'
So-called humane arms, conceived of as an alternative to conventional
weapons, tread a delicate line between permissible and impermissible use
of non-conventional devices. Nonlethal weapons are nonchemical,
incapacitating weapons that permit military engagement in new ways: by
disorienting and immobilizing targets with "loud noises, bright lights,
horrific odors, electrical shocks, dense smoke, superglues, rigid foams,
slippery greases and blunt projectiles."'8 17 After years of research, in 2001
the Pentagon debuted a microwave weapon with a range of over a third of
a mile, intended to disperse people without serious injury. 8 The weapon
"causes burning sensations on the skin, with no actual burning."' 89 There
are reports that the Pentagon has conducted work on incapacitating
chemicals, such as deploying powerful opiates into drug weapons. In May
2000, the Pentagon reportedly hired a Michigan company to investigate
184. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (July 8).
185. Id.
186. See William J. Broad, Oh, What a Lovely War. If No One Dies., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,

2002, at
187.
188.
189.

4:3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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chemical immobilizers, or "calmatives," a term used to refer to
pharmacological, mind-altering or sleep-inducing chemicals such as
Fentanyl. 190 The National Academy of Sciences has issued a report that
backs incapacitating chemicals. "We need to greatly accelerate work in
these areas," according to John B. Alexander, a retired Army colonel and
a member of the panel.' 9' He added, "The legal constraints are not
sufficiently binding that they should prohibit research."' 192
E. War TerminationProcessesand Restoration of the Environment
It was Kant who insisted on a category of just war theory pertaining to
justice after war. 93 However, today there is a paucity of established norms
with regard to war termination. For a century since the ratification of the
Hague Convention of 1907, no rules specifically governing the termination
of war have been enacted under the laws of armed conflict, although some
of the various international human rights declarations are interpreted in a
way that pertains to war termination.' 94 In any event, there is an absence
of ground rules to deal with the postwar handling of environmental
damage that is inherent in any war. There are no "settled expectations of
state behaviour during this very fragile time."' 95
This vacuum, it seems, can only encourage extremism and arbitrariness
on the part of the victor during the settlement process, and evasiveness,
resentment, and plans for future revenge on the part of the vanquished.
"The lack of law causes enormous interpretative problems regarding what
constitutes a reasonable peace settlement, since there are not even general
guidelines in place from which to launch a fair dialogue and negotiation
process." %
"

If the international community came together to establish international
laws of war termination, such a set of laws should take into consideration
the environmental harms inflicted by the combatants, and how they are to
be rectified. Such a set of norms would contribute to healing the wounds
of war, establish the parameters of minimally acceptable behavior of states
during war termination, and, with respect to the environment, specify
practical aims for restoration of environmental harms.

190. Id.
191. Broad, supra note 186, at 4:3.
192. Id.
193. See BRIAN OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 217
(2000).

194. See id. at 219.
195. Id. at 221.
196. Id.
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There is, however, a system for adjudicating environmental war
damage. In 1994 the United Nations adopted the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in Rome by a vote of 120 in favor, 21 abstentions,
and 7 against, after years of effort. 197 This is a permanent court that has
jurisdiction over serious international crimes regardless of where they
occur. This accomplishment shows the resolve of the international
community to ensure that those who commit serious international crimes
do not go unpunished. The United States did not sign this statute, albeit for
reasons unrelated to its environmental provision.
One of the war crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction is the
intentional "launching [of] an attack in the knowledge that such an attack
will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military 'advantage anticipated."'' 98 In the draft statute
this war crime was provided for both international and non-international
armed conflict, but the final statute only provides it for international armed
conflict. 99
'
Sometimes the scope of environmental harms may not be apparent until
years have gone by. A case in point is the Solomon Islands. It is
fascinating to note that this idyllic South Pacific nation, a British
protectorate until 1978, was the site of some of the fiercest naval combat
°° The Solomon Islands became the burial site of over
of World War II.2
five thousand sailors and marines from the United States, Australia, and
Japan who perished in the sinking of nearly fifty warships during the
Solomons campaign from August 1943 to February 1944.20' The graveyard,
primarily off the large island of Guadalcanal, called Iron Bottom Sound,
is now protected as a national historic site (albeit underwater). 2 2 In 1997,
the Solomon Islands' Prime Minister attempted to pressure parties to the
conflict to remedy recent damage to natural resources and loss of fishing
revenue he claimed was caused by systematic oil discharge from U.S.

197. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 126, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 1.L.M. 999 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc (last
visited June 11, 2003) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
198. Id. art. 8.2(b)(iv).
199. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ACONF. 183/2/Add. 1, 14
Apr. 1998, pp. 16, 24, available at http:/www.un.orgtlaw/n9810105.pdf (last visited June 11,
2003).
200. Gregg Anthony Cervi, War Wrecks and the Environment: Who's Responsible for the
Legacy of War? A Case Study: Solomon Islandsand the UnitedStates, 14 J. ENVTL L. & LrrIG. 351,
351-52 (1999).
201. Id. at 352-54.
202. Id.
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warships sunk during World War U.203 The Prime Minister claimed,
correctly, that the Solomon Islands were not a party to World War I/.2 0
The Japanese invaded and occupied the region of Guadalcanal in an effort
to gain tactical ground in an effort to blockade allied passage in the far
Pacific and Australia. Some might think that the claim of the Solomon
Island government is absurd, that there was a profound loss of American
lives in an effort to liberate the region from the Japanese onslaught, and
that in any event the Japanese should assume liability for all war-related
damage in that they were the aggressors. 2 5 At the same time, the United
States continues to claim ownership of its sunken warships, even though
they are located in the territorial waters of another sovereign state. 206 It is
not at all clear how much damage has been done to fish, coral, and other
marine life, and whether such damage can be scientifically
linked to the oil
20 7
country.
particular
any
of
ships
the
from
discharge
In any event, the main point here is that a set of satisfactory
international laws of war termination would need to address complex
issues, distinguishing between immediate environmental damage and the
kind of damage that may accrue over an attenuated period between the end
of a war and the discovery of environmental damage. Many other complex
issues would no doubt arise in formulating such a convention. On the
question of compensation for environmental damage, it would seem that
the aggressor nation owes some duty of compensation to the victim of the
aggression, but on the other hand, environmental damage can be, and
usually is, committed by both sides of a conflict. Moreover, it is not
always clear which party is the aggressor, particularly when a claim of preemptive strike precipitates the initial aggressive move. The issue of
compensation for environmental damage would be further complicated by
the asymmetrical power relation between the victor and the vanquished,
if there was an outright victory in the war. Traditionally, while states
sometimes lose a war without paying reparations, it seems to almost
always be the case that those that pay reparations are on the losing side. 208
However, any future commission on war termination would need to have
the authority to compel a wrongdoing victor to pay reparations. A just
system of reparations would seem to require that wrongdoers be punished
and victims be made whole.

203. Id. at 357.
204. Id.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Cervi, supra note 200, at 358.
Id.
See id. at 360.
Schmitt, supra note 18, at 91.
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Finally, remedies would need to take into account how far-reaching and
egregious the means of war deployed were. Were the actions of the
aggressor truly atrocious in terms of deploying weapons that caused, for
example, widespread, long-term, and severe damage due to a nuclear
weapon deployment? Did one combatant or another engage in actions that
violated ENMOD or other relevant treaties by deploying environmental
modification techniques, such as causing an earthquake, or flooding? Did
one side or the other violate Protocol I by attacking such targets as dikes,
dams, and power plants, without justification under the terms of that
convention? Did combatants commit war crimes such as deploying
weapons that are intrinsically indiscriminate and/or disproportionate? Did
one side or the other fail to take due care to protect civilian,populations?
Very likely, a future convention would need to establish a postwar
commission to address the panoply of issues in order to come to a just
resolution of environmental claims.
VI. CONCLUSION

The environment enjoys independent, truly unique, intrinsic value
value that often exceeds that of human artifacts. The environment is
interconnected with itself throughout the world in a way uniquely different
than the way people are connected. If a combatant poisons the water
quality of an enemy's river, for example, this is harm to all riparian states,
not simply the target state. The general irreplaceability of the environment
magnifies this dependency relationship.
It appears that a duty to protect the environment during armed conflict
is emerging as a binding customary principle of international law. At a
time when the world is becoming more and more concerned about
protecting the environment, we scarcely need remind ourselves that in our
era technology can advance to make possible actions which would cause
hitherto inconceivable environmental consequences.
There is significant disagreement as to what constitutes proper conduct
on the part of combatants during war. Warfare always occurs in the
presence of the environment. It seems self-evident that when nations go to
war they place other interests ahead of the environment, such as victory in
the armed conflict. Damage to the environment in one form or another,
whether planned or unplanned, is virtually inevitable in armed conflicts.
Indeed, it has been noted that
[m]ilitary necessity has . . . become the main justification for

deviation from restrictions in customary law.... While a number
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of principles relate to protection of the environment during warfare,
they are all subordinated to the principle of military necessity. Even
in the Geneva Protocols, the new basic rule on protecting the
natural environment (Article 35) is later subordinated to military
necessity. Article 55 states that "Care shall be taken in warfare to
protect the natural environment" (emphasis added), accepting that
environmental protection is not absolute. Despite acknowledgment
of the environmental effects of warfare, Richard Falk wrote in 1984,
"to turn to international law for relief provides only the most scant
basis for hope at present.... What is militarily attractive remains
permissible, or at least not explicitly prohibited, whereas that which
is of no 2evident relevance to war making is diligently
proscribed. °9
As technology develops, and the means and methods of warfare become
more advanced, military planners may be tempted to manipulate or attack
the environment of enemies in new ways to achieve military advantages
and efficient outcomes. Evidence exists that some states, such as Iraq, have
not gotten rid of biological and chemical weapons, and as it presently
stands, rogue states may well pose threats of biological and chemical
warfare that could result in extreme environmental harm.
Currently, new conventional weapons are available to inflict more
widespread destruction of targets than in previous wars. Recently, the Air
Force successfully tested the largest conventional bomb in American
history, a munition weighing over twenty-one thousand pounds - so big
that it must be dropped out of a cargo plane.21 0 The bomb, which explodes
just above the ground, sends a wave of detonation hundreds of yards in
each direction, and can decimate trees, foliage, and structures and kill all
humans and livestock within reach. 21' The new weapon is called the
Massive Ordinance Air Blast, or "Mother of All Bombs.2 12 This weapon
has a new generation satellite guidance system to help direct the bomb to
its target with greater accuracy than its predecessor, the 15,000-pound
BLU-82 (nicknamed the Daisy Cutter), which was "used in Afghanistan
to destroy caves believed to be used by forces of the Taliban and Al

209. GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 37, at 1069 (quoting W. ARKIN, D. DURRANT & M.
CHERNI, ON IMPACT: MODERN WARFARE AND THE ENVIRONMENT -

A CASE STUDY OF THE GULF

WAR 116, 123 (1991)).
210. Thorn Shanker, Largest ConventionalBomb Droppedin a Test in Florida,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2003, at A17.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Qaeda., 21 3 The BLU-82 was also used in Vietnam to destroy jungles and
establish landing zones for helicopters." 4
The scope of Protocol I has been criticized, particularly with respect to
the language of Article 35(3), which prohibits the use of "methods or
means of warfare which are intended, or inay be expected, to cause
widespread, long term and severe damage to the environment., 21 5
By including the "may be expected" language of article 35(3), the
drafters provided a legal ground for challenging the use of any
weapon that may affect the environment. . . . [T]he "may be
expected" language.., opens the door for war crimes prosecutions
in every case where the environment suffers incidental damage as
a result of military operations. The articles impose vague,
unworkable, and impractical requirements on military commanders
in an effort to prevent all collateral ecological damage, and should
not be ratified. 1 6
Another difficulty with Protocol I is that if a particular tactic, target, or
weapon is prohibited because the resulting environmental harm would
breach the widespread, long-term, and severe threshold, this may force
commanders to turn to alternatives that generate greater civilian casualties
or damage to civilian infrastructure than would otherwise be the case,
thereby throwing into disarray the traditional jus in belli principles of
military necessity, proportionality, and humanity.
Not until after Vietnam did the environment come to be seen as having
a separate existence of concern to military planners. The law has moved,
albeit slowly, toward recognizing the uniqueness of the environment and
its need for special protection in the context of war. This is apparent in
Protocol I and ENMOD's environment-specific provisions. But what
remains is a body of law that offers only haphazard and very limited
protection to the environment, protection characterized by significant gaps.
However, the assertion that the law is inadequate (or ambiguous, or that
it would not be observed by the military superpowers) does not necessarily
suggest that a new treaty is necessary. With regards to the possibility of
revising Protocol I or ENMOD, commentators have voiced diverse
opinions, including the following:

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Protocol 1, supra note 42, art. 35(3) (emphasis added).
Roberts, supra note 118, at 147-48.
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Such an attempt could run into fundamentally intractable problems
(of which there have already been foretastes in other negotiations)
about defining the natural environment; about defining damage to
it; about working out exactly which environmentally damaging acts
are forbidden; about distinguishing between intentional, collateral,
and completely unexpected damage to the environment; about
whether certain kinds of destruction, including even scorched earth,
might be permissible in certain circumstances, including perhaps to
a defending State within its own national territory; about
establishing exactly what military-related activities could be
permitted in any specially protected environmentally important
areas; and about the applicability of existing international norms in
non-international armed conflicts. The question of nuclear weapons
would inevitably be raised, and it would probably be as hard as ever
to bring such weapons within the framework of the laws of war." 7
The predominant opinion in the international community is that the present
law suffices and that it reflects the global community's values and evinces
its goals. One way the international community's interests may be best
served would be to "confront [the] sticky, practical and, indeed, often
seemingly intractable questions embedded in issues of compliance and
remedies. '2 '8 As in any area of law, the existence of the law is rendered
moot unless there is meaningful compliance and execution mechanisms,
not just in theory, but in practical application.
Other practical efforts can be fruitful. The world's armed forces can
agree to a standard set of norms to be adopted in their military manuals
and serve as a definitive guide in questions of the environment in time of
war. The U.S. Navy Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operationsis one of a few military manuals that address the protection of
the environment during armed conflict (albeit in general terms) as a
separate subject:
It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural
environment during an attack upon a legitimate military objective.
However, the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid
unnecessary damage to the environment to the extent that it is
217. Adam Roberts, Environmental Issues in InternationalArmed Conflict: The Experience
of the 1991 Gulf War, in PROTECTIONOFTHE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMEDCONFUCT, supra note
2, at 222, 268.
218. Dieter Fleck, Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and OtherMilitary
Operations: The Way Ahead, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT,

supra note 2, at 529, 532.
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practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To
that end, and as far as military requirements permit, methods or
means of warfare should be employed with due regard to the
protection and preservation of the natural environment. Destruction
of the natural environment not necessitated by mission
accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited. Therefore,
a commander should consider the environmental damage which will
result from an attack on a legitimate objective as one of the factors
during targeting analysis.2 9
The International Red Cross has issued a model set of guidelines suggested
for military manuals, but this effort has not been successful, in part
because the model incorporates the main elements of Protocol I, which the
United States and other powers do not embrace.22 ° Military manuals serve
an important function in the context of international law. Military manuals
are an essential component in the international lawmaking process,
often the litmus test of whether a putative prescriptive exercise has
produced effective law. Without adequate dissemination, this
putative international lawmaking is an exercise in the elaboration
of myth through lex simulata rather than the installation of an
effective operational code.22 '
In other words, once law gets internalized it acquires normative relevance
in the minds of those organizations and people who are guided by it. With
a military manual, its normative import gains momentum as it is
disseminated and endorsed by authoritative military planners.
The balancing test under the law of armed conflict (military necessity
and proportionality) may well need to take into account the evolving
nature of environmental concerns. That is, the value of the environment
may be greater now than it was a few years ago. Many think that the
traditional notions of proportionality and military necessity are evolving
and leaning more towards the intrinsic value perspective so that today a
higher degree of protection may be conferred on the environment when it
comes to applying balancing tests, given the international community's
heightened recognition of the environment's unique status.222 Moreover,
219. NWP 1-14M, supra note 62.18.1.3.
220. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 101.
221. W. Michael Reisman & William K. Leitzau, Moving International Law from Theory to
Practice: The Role ofMilitary Manualsin Effectuating the Law ofArmed Conflict, in THE LAW OF

NAVAL OPERATIONS 1, 1 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991).
222. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 24-25.
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the value of particular features of a given ecosystem is context dependent.
A lake in a region otherwise arid has much more anthropocentric value for
the well-being of the indigenous peoples than does a lake located in a
region that has an abundance of fresh water supply with a sparse
population. Finally, what constitutes "severe" environmental damage
under Protocol I and ENMOD must take into account evolving standards
as the world learns more about the effects of war on the environment.223
Turning to another point, in the face of armed conflict it remains to be
seen whether guidelines, military manuals, treaties and other protocols will
mean much, if anything, in the actual setting of war. Military commanders
understandably tend to accumulate and use all the firepower they can, both
to accomplish their assigned missions and to protect their troops from
harm. Sometimes they use more force than necessary, or miss their targets
because of poor planning, flawed intelligence, enemy deception, computer
glitches, or other equipment failure.
As the ICRC has noted, the law of war "might be swept aside by the
political, military or propaganda demands of the moment.,, 224 Decision
making in combat situations involves a continuous effort to adjust to and
accommodate on the spot developments in the battlefield. One
commentator on military necessity observes that
[t]his stress on doing what is necessary to win a given battle in the
course of a war almost inevitably produces a climate of opinion that
confers virtually unlimited discretion on military commanders in
the field. Such leaders continue to be judged and guided back home
mainly by calculations relating to achieving victory or avoiding
defeat in combat.225
Thus, military commanders might not follow the law even when the law
is clear. In fact, the classic understanding of international law is that
peacetime treaties do not survive the initiation of war unless they
specifically pertain to war, such as in the case of the Geneva Convention.
War usually signifies the erosion of many kinds of treaties - most notably
military aid agreements, so that, in general, their effects are suspended
between the adversaries.226 Others argue that with regards to peacetime
environmental treaties (that is, treaties that do not pertain to war, and
223. See Simonds, supra note 52, at 174-75.
224. ICRC, Appeal (Feb. 1, 1991), reprintedin INT'L REV. RED CROSS, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 27.
225. Richard A. Falk, The Inadequacy of the Existing Legal Approach to Environmental
Protectionin Wartime, in THE ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES OFWAR 137, 139 (Jay E. Austin

& Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000); see also Richards & Schmitt, supra note 61, at 1077.
226. See Schmitt, supra note 18, at 37.
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hence treaties other than Protocol I and ENMOD) for a more
contemporary or middle ground approach that even between warring states
certain types of obligations, such as basic rules relating to the
environment, are not suspended.227 This view is grounded in the notion, I
think, that the subject matter of certain treaties has ramifications that
concern and benefit third parties other than the belligerents. But the
recognition of environmental standards in time of war is at least a formal
acknowledgment of concern that can fuel the public conscience and
international pressures.
A further problem is that predictions of the extent of damage to an
environment are somewhat tentative. The reverberations from
environmental harm are quixotic compared to the reverberations from
harm done to conventional targets such as a military air field or radar
apparatus. The building can be rebuilt, and the impact on the surrounding
infrastructure is somewhat straightforward. But in contrast, environmental
damage, whether based on collateral damage or direct attacks on the
environment itself, is something that has much more complex
reverberations. Moreover, environmental damage is often difficult to
contain or control, regardless of the intent of the actor. The environmental
harm caused by Iraq's actions during Desert Storm continues to have
adverse effects in terms of poisoning of the soil and waters, and will
continue to have adverse effects on the local region, if not the world's
oceans, for many years to come. On the other hand, "many predictions of
what Gulf War damage would do to the environment proved
exaggerated. 2 28 Thus, operations in future wars may well need to undergo
scrutiny over a period of time before the degree of environmental risk can
be established.
Often enough, environmental damage may prove irreversible.
Destruction or contamination of an area by chemical or biological agents
may require the relocation of people and the migration (or extinction) of
local species. An example of this, mentioned above, is the Scottish island
of Gruinard which to this day remains contaminated with the causative
agent of anthrax.
Today military leaders and policymakers often display a growing
concern for the environment by considering the foreseeability of
environmental damage when they calculate proportionality. This is in
contrast to wars of, say, fifty years ago, where concern over war's
devastating effects on the environment was somewhat remote by
comparison. The future will certainly bring us greater abilities to
effectively manipulate the potentially dangerous forces that are pent-up in
227. See id. at 37 n.191.
228. See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 61, at 1082.
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the environment. On humanitarian principles, our efforts to develop
environmental modification techniques needs to be dedicated to the benefit
of humankind and nature. They must be carried out in good faith,
facilitated by international understanding and cooperation and in the spirit
of good neighborliness.
The global environment is being subjected to ever more serious strains
by a growing world population that seeks at least the basic necessities of
life as well as some of its amenities. In order to help ensure that the
increasingly limited resources of our environment are not further reduced
by hostile military activities, it is urged that environmental issues in
general and those raised by environmental warfare in particular be widely
publicized, through schools, the press and by other means, in order to help
develop and strengthen cultural norms in opposition to military activities
that cause direct or indirect environmental harm.
In future wars it is hoped that leaders will refrain from issuing dire
threats of environmentally destructive counterattacks such as occurred
with Iraqi leaders during the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The international
community needs to be able to dissuade military combatants from
engaging in environmentally destructive acts. I would suggest that in
today's theater of warfare the humanity principle would require all states
to desist from certain extreme environmental acts even though such acts
might not in themselves violate the threshold of damage contemplated by
Protocol I or ENMOD. For instance, poisoning the water supply of a small
town, using a chemical that would dissipate after a few weeks, technically
might not violate ENMOD because (just as many argued in the case of
Iraq's actions in setting ablaze the Kuwaiti oil fields) the act would not
necessarily be deemed a deliberate manipulation of natural processes but would simply be placing an additive (poison) to change the
composition of the water supply. This, however, is something that I readily
concede is debatable, and in any event the point I am making here is that
under the humanitarian principle this action would seem to be, on its face,
something that human beings simply do not do to other human beings, and
on that ground alone would be violative of the international law of war.229
229. However, the act of poisoning a population's water supply would in fact violate article
54(2) of Protocol 1,which states:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such as food stuffs, agricultural areas for
the production of food stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or

for any other motive.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/2
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We may be seeing a twinkling of an emerging norm, based the
humanitarian principle, that prohibits extensive environmental damage as
a method or means of warfare - because decent human beings simply do
not engage in such acts.
Ultimately, future generations will strive to reduce significantly the
likelihood that states will have need to resort to armed conflict at all.
Recent history demonstrates that war, even in its just and lawful forms, has
become increasingly destructive and is likely to become more so in the
future, given the technological advances of the means of war, and coupled
with an era in which the global population and its environment form a kind
of organic unity. Furthermore, it seems to me there comes a time in the
evolution of rational minded creatures when we need not engage in wars
over rights at all. Rather, we should be able to live so that the objects of
our rights emanate as a matter of course from rational discourse and just
political and social structures.23 0 As Kant suggested, war is a poor way for
rational agents to pursue what is inalienable to them. 23 1 "It is, so to speak,
beneath our rational dignity to keep being forced to stoop to warfare in
232
order to secure the objects of our rights on the international plane.

Protocol
230.
231.
232.

1,supra note 42, art. 54(2).
OREND, supra note 193, at 242.
Id.
Id.
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